APPENDIX TO CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 639 
The Russian Minister was deeply impressed by what Mr. Adams had said. He had 
not before clearly perceived the inevitable effect if he should insist on presenting the 
note in the form of a demand. He was not prepared for so serious a result as the 
destruction or the indefinite postponement of the Treaty between Russia and the 
United States, and Mr. Adams readily convinced him that at the exchange of ratifica- 
tions no modification of the Treaty could be made. The only two courses open were, 
first, to ratify; or, second, to refuse, and annul the Treaty. Mr. Adams reports the 
words of the Minister in reply: 
‘“‘The Baron said that these ideas had occurred to himself; that he had made this 
application in pursuance of his instructions, but he was aware of the distribution of 
powers in our Constitution, and of the incompetency of the Executive to adjust such 
questions. He would therefore wait for the exchange of the ratifications without 
presenting his note, and reserve for future consideration whether to present it shortly 
afterwards or toinform his Court of what he has done and ask their further instruc- 
tions upon what he shall definitely do on the subject.” . . . 
As Baron Tuyl surrendered his opinions to the superior judgment of Mr. Adams, 
the ratifications of the Treaty were exchanged on the 11th day of January, and on the 
following day the Treaty was formally proclaimed. A fortnight later, on the 25th 
January, 1825, Baron Tuyl, following the instructions of his Government, filed his 
note in the Department of State. Of course, his act at that time did not affect the 
text of the Treaty; but it placed in the hands of the Government of the United 
States an unofficial note which significantly told what Russia’s construction of the 
Treaty would be if, unhappily, any difference as to its meaning should arise between 
the two Governments. But Mr. Adams’ friendly intimation removed all danger of 
dispute, for it conveyed to Russia the assurance that the Treaty, as negotiated, con- 
tained, in effect, the provisions, which the Russian note was designed to supply. 
From that time until Alaska, with all its rights of land and water, was transferred 
-to the United States—a period of forty-three years—no act or word on the part of 
either Government ever impeached the full validity of the Treaty as it was understood 
both by Mr. Adams and by Baron Tuy] at the time it was formally proclaimed. 
While these important matters were transpiring in Washington, negotiations 
between Russia and England (ending in the Treaty of 1825) were in progress in St. 
Petersburgh. The instructions to Baron Tuyl concerning the Russian-American 
Treaty were fully reflected in the care with which the Anglo-Russian Treaty was 
constructed, a fact to which I have already adverted in full. There was, indeed, a 
possibility that the true meaning of the Treaty with the United States might be mis- 
understood, and it was therefore the evident purpose of the Russian Government to 
make the Treaty with England so plain and so clear as to leave no room for doubt and 
to baffle all attempts at misconstruction. The Government of the United States finds 
the full advantage to it in the caution taken by Russia in 1825, and can therefore 
quote the Angio-Russian Treaty, with the utmost confidence that its meaning cannot 
be changed from that clear unmistakable text which, throughout all the Articles, 
sustains the American contention. 
The ‘‘ explanatory note,” filed with this Government by Baron Tuy], is so plain in 
its text that, after the lapse of sixty-six years, the exact meaning can neither be mis- 
apprebended nor misrepresented. It draws the distinction between the Pacific 
50 Ocean and the waters now known as the Behrings’ Sea so particularly and so per- 
spicuously that no answer can be made toit. It will bear the closest analysis 
in every particular. ‘‘It is not the intention of Russia to impede the free navigation 
of the Pacific Ocean” This frank and explicit statement shows with what entire 
good faith Russia had withdrawn, in both Treaties, the offensive Ukase of Alexander, 
so far as the Pacific Ocean was made subject toit. Another avowal is equally explicit, 
viz., that ‘‘the coast of Siberia, the north-west coast of America to 59° 30’ of north 
latitude [that is, down to 59° 30’, the explanatory note reckoning from north to 
south] and the Aleutian Islands are positively excepted from the liberty of hunting, 
fishing, and commerce stipulated in favour of citizens of the United States for ten 
years.” The reason given for this exclusion is most significant in connection with 
the pending discussion, namely, that the coasts of Siberia are washed by the Sea 
of Okhotsk, the Sea of Kamschatka, and the Icy Sea, and not by the ‘‘South Sea” 
[Pacific Ocean] mentioned in the Ist Article of the Convention of the 5th (17th) April, 
1824, The Aleutian Islands are also washed by the Sea of Kamschatka, or Northern 
Ocean (Northern Ocean being used in contradistinetion to South Sea or Pacific Ocean.) 
The liberty of hunting, fishing, and commerce mentioned in the Treaties was there- 
fore confined to the coast of the Pacific Ocean south of 59° 30’ both to the United 
States and Great Britain. It must certainly be apparent now to Lord Salisbury that 
Russia never intended to include the Behring’s Sea in the phrase ‘ Pacific Ocean.” 
The American argument on that question has been signally vindicated by the official 
declaration of the Russian Government. 
In addition to the foregoing, Russia claimed jurisdiction of 2 marine leagues from 
the shore in the Pacific Ocean, a point not finally insisted upon in either Treaty. 
