642 APPENDIX TO CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 
words, they related to the contest which was finally adjusted by the establishment 
of the line 54° 40’, which marked the boundary between Russian and English terri- 
tory at the time of the Anglo-Russian Treaty, as to-day it marks the line of division 
between Alaska and British Columbia. But that question in no way touched the 
Behring’s Sea; it was confined wholly to the Pacific Ocean and the north-west coast. 
Lord Salisbury has deemed it proper, in his despatch, to call the attention of the 
Government of the United States to some elementary principles of international law 
touching the freedom of the seas. For our better instruction he gives sundry extracts 
trom Wheaton and Kent—our most eminent publicists—and, for further illustration, 
quotes from the despatches of Secretaries Seward and Fish, all maintaining the well- 
known principle that a nation’s jurisdiction over the sea is limited to 3 marine miles 
from its shore line. Commenting on these quotations, his Lordship says: 
“A claim of jurisdiction over the open sea which is not in accordance with the 
recognized principles of international law or usage may, of course, be asserted by 
force, but cannot be said to have any legal validity as against the vessels of other 
countries, except in so far as it is positively admitted in Conventional Agreements 
with those countries.” 
The United States, having the most extended sea-coast of all the nations of the 
world, may be presumed to have paid serious attention to the laws and usages which 
define and limit maritime jurisdiction. The course of this Government has been 
uniformly in favour of upholding the recognized law of nations on that subject. 
While Lord Salisbury’s admonitions are received in good part by this Government, 
we feel justified in asking his Lordship if the Government of Great Britain has uni- 
formly illustrated these precepts by example, or whether she has not established at 
least one notable precedent which would justify us in making greater demands upon 
Her Majesty’s Government touching the Behring’s Sea than either our necessities or 
our desires have ever suggested? ‘The precedent to which I refer is contained in the 
following narative: 
Napoleon Bonaparte fell into the power of Great Britain on the 15th July, 1815. 
The disposition of the illustrious prisoner was primarily determined by a Treaty 
negotiated at Paris on the 2nd of the following August between Great Britain, 
53 Russia, Prussia. and Austria. By that Treaty ‘‘the custody of Napoleon is 
specially intrusted to the British Government.” The choice of the place and 
of the measures which could best secure the prisoner were especially reserved to His 
Britannic Majesty. In pursuance of this power, Napoleon was promptly sent by 
Great Britain to the Island of St. Helena as a prisoner for life. Six months after 
he reached St. Helena the British Parliament enacted a special and extraordinary 
Law for the purpose of making his detention more secure. It was altogether a 
memorable Statute, and gave to the British Governor of the Island of St. Helena 
remarkable powers over the property and rights of other nations. The Statute con- 
tains eight long sections, and in the 4th section assumes the power to exclude ships 
of any nationality, not only from landing on the island, but forbids them ‘to hover 
within 8 leagues of the coast of the island.” ‘The penalty for hovering within 8 
leagues of the coast is the forfeiture of the ship to His Majesty the King of Great 
Britain, on trial to be had in London, and the offence to be the same as if committed 
in the County of Middlesex. This power was not assumed by a military com- 
mander, pleading the silence of law amid the clash of arms; nor was it conferred by 
the power of civil government in a crisis of public danger. It was a Parliamentary 
enactment in a season of profound peace that was not broken in Europe by war 
among the Great Powers for eight-and-thirty years thereafter. (See Inclosure C.) 
The British Government thus assumed exclusive and absolute control over a con- 
siderable section of the South Atlantic Ocean, lying directly in the path of the 
world’s commerce, near the capes which mark the southernmost points of both 
hemispheres, over the waters which for centuries had connected the shores of all 
continents, and afforded the commercial highway from and to all the ports of the 
world. The body of water thus controlled, in the form of a circle nearly 50 miles in 
diameter, was scarcely less than 2,000 square miles in extent; and whatever ship 
dared to tarry or hover within this area might, regardless of its nationality, be 
forcibly seized and summarily forfeited to the British King. 
The United States had grave and special reasons for resenting this peremptory 
assertion of power by Great Britain. On the 8rd day of July, 1815, a fortnight after 
the Battle of Waterloo and twelve days before Napoleon became a prisoner of war, 
an important Commercial Treaty was concluded at London between the United 
States and Great Britain. It was the sequel to the Treaty of Ghent, which was 
concluded some six months before, and was remarkable, not only from the character 
of its provisions, but from the eminence of the American negotiators—John Quincy 
Adams, Henry Clay, and Albert Gallatin. Among other provisions of this Treaty 
relaxing the stringent colonial policy of England was one which agreed that Ameri- 
can ships should be admitted and hospitably received at the Island of St, Helena. 
Before the ratifications of the Treaty were exchanged in the following November, 
it was determined that Napoleon should be sent to St. Helena. England thereupon 
