24 BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY [bull. 40 



Jiills, the terminal s does not enter our consciousness as a separate 

 element with separate significance, expressing the idea of plurality, — 

 except, perhaps, in so far as our grammatical training has taught us 

 the fact that plurals may be formed by the use of a terminal s, — but 

 the word forms a firm unit, which conveys a meaning only as 

 a whole. The variety of uses of the terminal s as a plural, pos- 

 sessive, and third person singular of the verb, and the strong effort 

 required to recognize the phonetic identity of these terminal elements, 

 may be adduced as a further proof of the fact that the single 

 phonetic elements become conscious to us only as a result of analysis. 

 A comparison of words that differ only in a single sound, like mail 

 and nail, snalce and stales, makes it also clear that the isolation of 

 sounds is a result of secondary analysis. 



Grammatical Categories 



Differences in Categories of different L(in(jiiages 



In all articulate speech the groups of sounds which are uttered 

 serve to convey ideas, and each group of sounds has a fixed meaning. 

 Languages differ not only in the character of their constituent 

 phonetic elements and sound-clusters, but also in the groups of ideas 

 that find expression in fixed phonetic groups. 



Li/tnitation of the Niiinber of Phouetic Groups Express- 

 ing Ideas 



The total number of possible combinations of phonetic elements is 

 also unlimited; but only a limited number are used to express ideas. 

 This implies that the total number of ideas that are expressed by 

 distinct phonetic groups is limited in number. 



Since the total range of personal experience which language serves 

 to express is infinitely varied, and its whole scope must be expressed 

 by a limited number of phonetic groups, it is obvious that an extended 

 classification of experiences must underlie all articulate speech. 



This coincides with a fundamental trait of human thought. In our 

 actual experience no two sense-impressions or emotional states are 

 identical. Nevertheless we classify them, according to their simi- 

 larities, in wider or narrower groups the limits of which may be 

 determined from a variety of points of view. Notwithstanding their 

 individual differences, we recognize in our experiences common ele- 

 ments, and consider them as related or even as the same, provided a 



