64 BUKEAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY [bull. 40 



The question of the relation of Hnguistic phenomena to ethno- 

 logical phenonu-na, in the narrower sense of the term, deserves, 

 therefore, special discussion. 



Language ami Thought 



First of all, it may be well to discuss the relation between language 

 and thought. It has been claimed that the conciseness and clearness 

 of thought of a people depend to a great extent upon their language. 

 The ease with which in our modern European languages we express 

 wide abstract ideas by a single term, and the facility with wdiich 

 wide generalizations are cast into the frame of a simple sentence, have 

 been claimed to be one of the fundamental conditions of the clearness 

 of our concepts, the logical force of our thought, and the precision with 

 which we eliminate in our thoughts irrelevant details. Apparently this 

 view has much in its favor. When we compare modern English with 

 some of those Indian languages which are most concrete in their forma- 

 tive expression, the contrast is striking. When we say Tlie eye 

 is the organ of sight, the Indian may not be able to form the expres- 

 sion the eye, but may have to define .that the eye of a person or 

 of an animal is meant. Neither may the Indian be able to generalize 

 readily the abstract idea of an eye as the representative of the whole 

 class of objects, but may have to specialize by an expression like 

 this eye here. Neither may he be able to express by a single term 

 the idea of organ, but may have to specify it by an expression 

 like instrument of seeing, so that the whole sentence might assume 

 a form like An indefinite person's eye is his means of seeing. Still, it 

 will be recognized that in this more specific form the general idea 

 may be well expressed. It seems very questionable in how far the 

 restriction of the use of certain grammatical forms can really be con- 

 ceived as a hindrance in the formulation of generalized ideas. It 

 seems much more likely that the lack of these forms is due to the 

 lack of their need. Primitive man, when conversing with his fellow- 

 man, is not in the habit of discussing abstract ideas. His interests 

 center around the occupations of his daily life; and where philo- 

 sophic problems are touched upon, they appear either in relation to 

 definite individuals or in the more or less anthropomorphic forms of 

 religious beliefs. Discourses on qualities without connection with 

 the object to which the qualities belong, or of activities or states 

 disconnected from the idea of the actor or the subject being in a 



