NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTS OF BATTLESHIPS. 

 By Sir William H. White, K. C. B., P. R. S., D. Sc, D. Eng., LL. D., Honorary MembBr. 



[Read at the eighteenth general meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, held in 



New York, November 17 and 18, 1910.] 



The Council of this Society have honored me by making the request 

 that I should contribute a paper to the Proceedings. After full considera- 

 tion it has appeared that, in existing circumstances, it may be of interest 

 to members to attempt a summary of the principles which should regulate 

 the armaments of modern battleships. Wide and deep differences of 

 opinion prevail in regard to this subject; as a consequence it may be antic- 

 ipated that conclusions which the writer has reached will be challenged and 

 declared to be unsound. Nothing but good can result from discussion 

 and criticism when they are conducted on proper and temperate lines as 

 they will be in this Society; and consequently the writer has not hesitated 

 to express freely his dissent from doctrines which other persons have set 

 forth in dealing with the subject, and will not object to equally free criticism 

 being made of the following statement of principles to which he has been 

 led by study and experience during the forty-three years that have elapsed 

 since he first joined the Constructive Department of the British Admiralty. 



One fundamental idea has governed the armaments of warships in 

 all ages: viz., the desire to provide means of oflfense which will enable a 

 ship making an attack to put her enemy "out of action" in the shortest 

 possible time and ensure the least possible damage to the attacking ship 

 during the conflict. Until armor was first used for defensive purposes, 

 about half a century ago, there was universal agreement with the doctrine 

 that "an active and powerful offense constituted the best means of defense." 

 Since that date this doctrine has been somewhat obscured, no doubt, by 

 the attention devoted to improved methods of manufacturing armor, 

 to rival systems of distributing protective materials; by the never-ending 

 struggle between the attack and the defense — guns and armor — and 

 by the development of under-water attacks — locomotive torpedoes and 

 torpedo vessels, submarine mines and submarines. It may be admitted 

 also that, under modern conditions, an active offense is no longer the only 

 means of defense; but, on the other side, it cannot be denied that an active 

 offense is still and always must continue to be the best means of defense. 

 It gives the greatest assurance of victory — in other words the greatest 

 probability of putting an enemy "out of action." 



