NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTS OF BA'lTLESHIPS. ii 



only to be abandoned in later designs, in some cases before practical expe- 

 rience had been gained with the arrangement which was abandoned. Now 

 there is a marked disposition to place all the heavy-gun stations at the 

 center line of the deck, so that all the guns may be available on both broad- 

 sides. This is a return to a disposition adopted in the earliest British turret 

 ships built nearly half a century ago. The Royal Sovereign (1862) and 

 the Prince Albert which followed immediately after her each had four 

 turrets so placed. It may be noted that the United States Navy took the 

 lead in this last movement, and further has the credit of demonstrating 

 the possibility of associating powerful bow and stern fire with the maximum 

 of broadside fire over large arcs of training, by placing some turrets higher 

 than others and firing over the lower turrets on certain bearings. 



"end-on" and broadside fire. 



' Advocates of "end-on" fire assert that an attacking ship which is 

 end-on to an enemy presents to her fire a target of which the projected 

 area (on a vertical plane) has, for its largest dimension, the extreme breadth 

 of the ship and for its height the height of her uppermost deck; so that 

 the chance of hitting effectively is diminished greatly as compared with 

 broadside attack. This statement overlooks important conditions, and 

 is therefore misleading. A ship attacking end-on must present to the 

 fire of an enemy a horizontal target of which the greatest dimensions are 

 the full length of the vessel, and (transversely) her extreme breadth. Con- 

 sequently errors in elevation of guns which the enemy may make are less 

 likely to result in missing this long horizontal target than would be the 

 case if corresponding errors were made when firing at a target of which 

 the greatest dimension was the extreme breadth of a ship lying broadside on 

 to the line of fire. No one can deny that the minimum of defense of vital 

 parts of battleships — especially against "dropping" fire at long ranges — 

 is to be found in the resistance offered by protective-deck plating, and not 

 in the strength of vertical side armor. Nor can it be doubted that even 

 in single-ship actions it would hardly be possible for a combatant to main- 

 tain for long the assumed "end-on" position; while in fleet actions no 

 commander could possibly effect a similar object with a large number of 

 ships by any conceivable tactics, if engaged against a skilful and mobile 

 enemy. If a choice has to be made, therefore, between highly developed 

 broadside and end-on fire it seems reasonable to give precedence to the 

 former. This has been done in the majority of recent battleships; but 

 it is also reasonable — ^having regard to great and rapid variations unavoid- 



