NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTS OF BATTLESHIPS. 15 



guns as compared with the Florida of 510 feet in length with ten 12 -inch 

 guns. It is true, of course, that increase of speed has even greater influ- 

 ence on dimensions and especially on length ; but it is certainly remarkable 

 to note the construction of armored ships which are about 700 feet in length 

 and yet carry only eight heavy guns in four positions (13.5-inch caliber), 

 whereas only five years ago ships about 200 feet shorter carried ten heavy 

 guns (12-inch) in five positions, and others about 250 feet shorter carried 

 twelve heavy guns (ii-inch) in six positions. Such additions to length 

 may not be considered objectionable on the ground of diminished maneuver- 

 ing power, in view of the facts that in future long-range fighting will be 

 the fashion, and that by various devices their handiness has been increased 

 in proportion to their dimensions. On the other hand, it appears obvious 

 that, when associated in fleets, vessels of this great length and high speed 

 will require for safe handling an increase in the intervals between successive 

 ships, so that the length of the line in proportion to the number of ships 

 comprising it will have to be sensibly enlarged. Nor can it be disputed 

 that this great increase in length renders greater the danger of damage 

 from torpedo attack: the commander of a fleet composed of these long, 

 swift ships may intend and attempt to keep outside torpedo range, yet in 

 action that intention may not be realized. 



Under-water attacks by torpedoes, by submarines and by mines are 

 undoubtedly among the greatest dangers to which modern warships 

 are exposed, although the gun still remains the supreme weapon of offense. 

 It is agreed that a single successful blow struck by a modern torpedo will 

 probably produce damage which will put even the largest ship "out of 

 action" although she may remain afloat. On this ground, therefore, it may 

 be maintained that a limit ought to be put upon the concentration of 

 many heavy guns in single ships, and upon the increase in dimensions and 

 costs of individual ships; because a single successful blow may, by general 

 consent, bring about such a serious proportionate loss to a fleet by injury 

 to one vessel and her compulsory withdrawal from action. Moreover, 

 many services are required from a fleet in the performance of which capacity 

 for distributing the force is no less important than the power of concen- 

 trating it for an attack. From this point of view unlimited increase in 

 dimensions, cost and individual power of battleships is not desirable. As 

 to the assertion that increased steadiness of ships, considered as gun plat- 

 forms, necessarily proceeds pari passu with increased dimensions, it need 

 only be said that experience has proved the doctrine to be fallacious. Battle- 

 ships of the modern type carrying numerous heavy guns high above water, 

 and protected by great weights of armor, must be endowed with considerable 



