22 - NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTS OE BATTI.ESHIPS. 



made of as large caliber as possible. We have now risen from four big guns to 

 twelve or thirteen, and from 12-inch to 14-inch. The notorious difficulty of plac- 

 ing several pairs, shown by Sir William White, necessarily of itself impels to 

 fewer pairs of heavier guns. This means of course proportionately fewer dis- 

 charges and fewer hits. All is staked on the disastrous effect of the large pro- 

 jectile, hitting less often; just as against a mixed battery all is staked on the 

 secondary (or intermediate) battery — the 6-inch guns— being kept out of action 

 by superior speed. 



The assumptions of the advocates of all-big-gun ships are precarious though 

 plausible. Chief among them is the assured ability to choose distance, at least 

 for a time, long enough to cripple the assailant decisively. This is the corner- 

 stone of the whole edifice. Upon this is built up the entire program — more and 

 more big-gun fire, therefore bigger gims with fewer emplacements; bigger and 

 bigger ships and fewer of them. Sight is lost of the fact, which Sir William brings 

 forward, that the guns in three ships can be brought to bear eft'ectively on the 

 same number in two ships. This is concentration of fire; while the three ships, 

 as compared with the two, give dispersion of target, a defensive provision entailing 

 little offensive loss. This is exactly as in harbor defense; guns bearing from 

 numerous positions on a critical point concentrate fire, yet gain comparative 

 immunity through their separateness — dispersion of target. 



The efficacy of bigger ships and fewer of them depends in part upon the 

 considerations of concentration of fire — upon a few ships, and upon dispersion of 

 target — among several ships, or gun emplacements. A bigger ship has an evident 

 advantage over a smaller in a ship duel. In a fleet action the bigger ship rein- 

 forces proportionately the position in the fleet in which she is placed. But it 

 does not follow that, in a combat of two ships against three, or eight against 

 twelve, the same inequality continues. The dispersion of the target among twelve 

 ships, the localization of a severe injury in one smaller ship instead of one bigger, 

 the larger power of combination in twelve units over that in eight, all tend not 

 only to compensate but to overcome the concentrated power (not concentrated 

 fire) of the larger vessel, which is conspicuous in a ship duel. 



The question ultimately is the difficult one of drawing a line. No one, for 

 instance, wants one-gun ships, but a respectable school revolts at the twelve 

 all-big guns; and the revolt is greater when more are proposed with increasing 

 size of vessel and reduced numbers in the fleet. Collateral questions arise, e. g., 

 dockage for such vessels and their use of navigable waters. Already Chesapeake 

 Bay is found too shoal for the increased draughts of battleships. 



In conclusion Sir WilHam White mentions that the Japanese have not aban- 

 doned the secondary or intermediate battery. I believe that this is also true of 

 the German Navy, if not indeed of all save the British. 



Professor William Hovgaard, Member: — This paper puts the question of the 

 armament of battleships before us in a remarkably clearway; it disentangles in an 



