H NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTS OF BATTLESHIPS. 



The amior-piercing effect has much greater chances of reaching the vitals, of 

 deahng deadly blows, and a greater number of 12 -inch hits seems here preferable to 

 a smaller number of, say, 14-inch hits, the individual effect of which is not much 

 greater. 



It must be borne in mind, also, that with a given number and disposition of 

 guns, an increase in caUber means an increase in displacement, and this leads up 

 to the main point which I want to discuss, viz., whether such addition to the dis- 

 placement and hence to the load carried is not much better employed in strength- 

 ening the torpedo armament and the protection against submarine attack. 



4. An Increase in the Torpedo Armament oj Battleships and in their Submarine 

 Protection.— It will probably be objected by many, that it is of no use to fit a power- 

 ful torpedo battery in battleships, since future battles will be fought on great ranges. 

 The torpedo is in other words regarded merely as a defensive weapon which, so it 

 is thought, forces the ships to keep on long ranges. This doctrine of long-range 

 fighting, which has become so generally accepted during the peace period following 

 the Japanese war, is not supported in a definite manner by the experiences of that 

 war; it certainly breaks down in thick weather and under many circumstances due 

 to navigational difficulties. But also from a purely tactical point of view, the 

 doctrine seems open to serious criticism. History furnishes an abundance of 

 examples where similar theories have been exploded, both on land and sea. 



Before the time of Frederick the Great it was considered the highest art of 

 strategy and tactics to try to secure secondary advantages by the occupation of 

 outlying fortresses or territories of the enemy, by securing strategical bases and 

 by overwhelming and defeating minor detached forces, while decisive action against 

 the main army of the enemy was avoided. Frederick the Great broke entirely 

 with this custom; he went right for the enemy's main army, fought it and destroyed 

 it. He was severely criticised for this unscientific method by contemporary strat- 

 egists, but he always beat his enemies. Precisely the same strategy and tactics 

 were followed by Napoleon, no maneuvering about the enemy at great distance, 

 but decisive blows at close quarters was his principle. 



Nelson had the same principle. Before his time fleets would keep going at 

 great ranges, sailing along parallel fines, firing for whole days at each other without 

 much result, but Nelson broke completely away from these tactics. Thus at 

 Aboukir, at Copenhagen and at Trafalgar he engaged the enemy at close quarters. 



I do not mean to intimate that ships will fight at so close ranges in future 

 battles as was the case at the time of Nelson, but it seems to me quite possible that 

 commanders may by found who will prefer fighting at ranges of a few thousand 

 yards, and who will use their superiority in speed, if anj^ in tr)ang to close in with 

 the enemy instead of nmning out to maximum range. 



This seems the more likely to occur if we equip the battleships as I propose, by 

 giving them, on the one hand, a powerful torpedo battery, and on the other a 

 stronger underwater protection. 



As I have shown elsewhere (Jane's Fighting Ships, 1910) that it is quite 



