26 NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTS OF BATTLESHIPS. 



lower turret. To determine this question, a 12-inch gun was mounted on the 

 monitor Florida (now Tallahassee) so as to fire over the turret, and firing trials 

 carried out, there being imprisoned in the turret, I believe, first cats and dogs, then 

 midshipmen and so on' up to rear-admirals. After the question of safety was 

 settled, there were, of course, a number of other questions of prime importance, 

 such as the provision of adequate strength in the supports of the upper turret, the 

 sighting arrangements for the lower turret, etc. The results of target practise of 

 the four vessels of the fleet now in service with the "vertical echelon" arrangement 

 of turret have been, I may say, very good, indicating that the many problems of 

 the constructor and ordnance engineer involved by the new departure were suc- 

 cessfully solved. 



The distinguished author believes in the four-turret diposition of the Michigan, 

 as against five and six turrets, as found on later ships. This opinion is shared by 

 many of the most capable and experienced officers in the United States service; 

 but it is not possible to install the number of heavy guns demanded by the majority 

 of our officers in four-gun positions unless we use three-gun turrets. 



The author is not in favor of the triple-gun turret, although he does not take 

 strong ground against it. He says, in eft'ect, that only war experience could finally 

 settle the question of its desirability. On this point I would like to mildly disagree 

 with the author, and record my opinion that war experience may be most deceiving. 

 If we could have a war lasting several years with a battle every month, the experi- 

 ence gained would of course be conclusive as regards practically all professional 

 questions. But when there is but a single battle, or two at most, the elements of 

 chance may very well entirely obscure the result as regards technical matters. We 

 naturally draw as many conclusions as possible from the practical experience of 

 war; but, I repeat, results of a single battle may well lead us to fallacious conclusions. 



At the battle of Lissa, in 1870, the victors used ramming tactics most success- 

 fully, and, for years, every navy in the world attached great importance to the ram. 

 When we undertook the reconstruction of the Navy, about 1881, a number of rams 

 were recommended by the First Advisory Board, and finally we built one upon the 

 ideas of a most distinguished officer, completing it more than twenty years after 

 the battle of Lissa. 



By that time, however, the development of the gun and torpedo had practically 

 wiped out the chances of successful ramming, and the experience of the battle of 

 Lissa is not now regarded as warranting any importance being attached to the ram 

 as a naval weapon. 



It is very doubtful if it really warranted the importance attached to the ram 

 during the few years immediately subsequent to the battle. 



There is a good old English proverb, which, it seems to me, should always be 

 borne in mind when we undertake to learn the "lessons" from a naval battle, 

 namely, ' ' One swallow does not make a summer. ' ' 



In his advocacy of good secondary armaments, the author takes strong ground 

 on one side of a much debated question, and produces strong arguments for his 

 contention. 



