NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTS OF BATTLESHIPS. 27 



There is no question that to-day the disposition and protection of the secondary 

 armament of a large battleship is about the most puzzhng problem of the whole 

 design, and happy the designer who has no secondary armament to contend with. 

 In the Michigan and South Carolina we had practically no secondary armament, 

 because on the limits of displacement it was not possible to provide it, but we soon 

 reverted to it. 



Most nations have never given it up. England alone has practically left off 

 a secondary armament from a number of ships. It is true that we call our secondary 

 armament "anti-torpedo-boat guns" or some such name, but the fact remains 

 that it is a powerful battery, the 5 -inch guns we now fit being about as powerful as 

 the 6-inch guns of a few years ago. 



If we may judge the future by the past, the secondary armament will refuse 

 to stay abandoned in any navy. 



The BngHsh Dreadnought of nearly thirty years ago — the largest, fastest, 

 most powerful vessel of her time, outclassing all others, had practically no secondary 

 battery. About that time, the torpedo-boat menace grew, and the secondary 

 battery began its rise. It was given a big impetus about 1884 by the destruction 

 French quick-firing guns wrought in an affair with the Chinese, and the secondary 

 battery grew and grew until, a few years ago, it grew up to the primary battery. 

 Immediately, however, the development of a new secondary battery began. There 

 is Httle doubt that, whether logical or not, the secondary battery will persist in spite 

 of the difficulties connected with it, and the author's belief in 6-inch guns seems 

 fully warranted by the almost universal practise of the present day. Indeed it 

 seems very probable that even England will soon fall into line in this respect. 



The statement on page 10 that "in many cases history has been repeating 

 itself" appeals particularly to me. No one can study naval developments for even 

 a few years back without finding many cases where naval opinion has svvfung around 

 in a circle, and the author, with his experience of forty-three years, is doubtless able 

 to recall a number of cases where the complete circle has been traversed more than 

 once. While m.any naval officers are conservative, there is no question that naval 

 opinion as a whole, if reflected, as presumably it is, in designs of naval vessels — 

 has during the last fifty years been in a constant process of change and re-crystalH- 

 zation in marked contrast to the conditions during the early part of the last century, 

 and for at least two centuries before. 



It may be interesting to recall that this period of shifting opinion is practically 

 coincident with the development of the naval architect and marine engineer as 

 paramount factors in the design of naval vessels, and it might be maintained that 

 the technical man is responsible for the incessant change in naval opinion, and not 

 the traditionally conservative seagoing officer. (Applause.) 



Chief Constructor Washington E. ^Capps, Vice-President: — It is to be 

 regretted, I think, that officers of the Ordnance Branch of the naval service are not 

 here to participate in the discussion, as it deals with matters that particularly 



