32 NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTS OF BATTLESHIPS. 



such guns mounted in positions in which they can be used in action against other 

 ships, it seems sufficiently obvious that no commanding officer will refuse to use 

 such guns in an action because they are denominated anti-torpedo guns; if he is 

 able to fire them he mil use them against an enemy. If such is the case, it seems 

 the part of wisdom to make such guns of at least such a caliber and weight that 

 they will be effective guns against the enemy's large ships. (Applause.) 



Sir Wiluam White (Communicated): — Having carefully read the notes of the 

 discussion which followed upon my paper when it Avas read I would submit the 

 following comments. 



To all who joined in that discussion, either in speech or writing, I would desire 

 at the outset to express my thanks for the kind terms in which reference has been 

 made to the value of the paper and its fairness of statement of the case. It is also 

 most welcome to me to find such a consensus of opinion in favor of the main con- 

 clusions at which I have arrived among gentlemen of recognized authority on 

 the subjects treated. 



Although I ha\-e necessarily bestowed much time and thought on the study of 

 naval strategy and tactics in connection with the design of warships, it seemed best 

 to minimize my references to that branch of the subject in the paper, and to dwell 

 chiefly upon those features of the problem Avhich directly affect the designs of 

 battleships. The fundamental idea which I had in view, however, and on which 

 my criticisms of single-caliber big-gun armaments vrere chiefly based, is exactly 

 that which Admiral Mahan has expressed admirably and tersely when deahng 

 with the question of the possibility of maintaining a very long range in action. 

 Admiral Mahan is absolutely correct in the statement that maintenance of long 

 range by a fleet or ship possessing superior speed is only possible by means of 

 "constant withdrawal," and a possible abandonment of any ships in that fleet 

 which maybe temporarily hampered in their steaming capability, or be compelled 

 to slow down in consequence of injuries. Moreover it is a matter of common experi- 

 ence in maneuvers in the Atlantic, and particularly in northern seas (where fogs and 

 thick weather frequently prevail) , that fleets accidentally blunder against another 

 and make the discovery suddenly that they are in close propinquity. For these 

 and other reasons I am convinced that the possession of a powerful and well-pro- 

 tected secondary armament of 6-inch quick-firing guns should be an essential feature 

 in the armament of modern battleships. As Admiral Mahan points out it is most 

 unwise to state everything on hypotheses which may not or cannot be fulfilled in 

 practise, such as the maintenance of very long range in all naval actions or the 

 supposed disastrous effect of projectiles fired from very large guns hitting less 

 frequently than the projectiles of smaller guns. Perseverance in that course of 

 action becomes an obstinate m.adness, when the battleships armed on the single- 

 caliber big-gun principle have to encounter other fleets which are equipped with 

 powerful secondary armaments as well as with big guns. Some of the speakers said, 

 with perfect truth, that the British Admiralty has been left in a position of having 



