NOTES ON THE ARMAMENTvS OF BATTEESHIPS. 33 



adopted powerful secondary armaments in their latest ships. In my paper I 

 preferred not to dwell upon that aspect of the question, although it is absolutely 

 true. Recent statements made in the British press indicate that the force of the 

 argument is now being recognized, and that 6-inch guns are likely to be reintro- 

 troduced into British battleships. The chief reason given for their reappearance 

 is that they are necessary- in order to provide adequately against the attack of 

 torpedo vessels. At the same time it is admitted that, when once moumted, these 

 6-inch guns will be used also in battle. So long as the guns are carried they can be 

 used as thought desirable and no one need trouble much about the reasons given 

 for their reintroduction. 



Admiral Mahan endorses the view which I put forward that the power of con- 

 centrating gun-fire on an enemy is not lessened by carr}'ing a certain number of 

 heavy guns in a larger number of ships owing to the fact that at long ranges the 

 larger number of ships bring their guns to bear eft'ectively on a single point in the 

 enemy's line. He also agrees with the opinion expressed in the paper that an 

 increase of numbers of ships making up a fleet, when kept within reasonable limits, 

 is advantageous as diminishing ri.sks from under-water attacks and giving greater 

 flexibility to the action of a fleet. Pushed home to its extreme form the argument 

 in favor of the "monster" battleship carrj-ing a big-gun armament would lead to 

 the advocacy of a single huge ship of which the defense should be made practically 

 invulnerable and the power of the individual gun irresistible; but Avhen stated in 

 that extreme form the absurdity of the position becomes obvious and no comment 

 is required. 



Advocates of the single-caliber big-gun armament and of extremely long fighting 

 ranges take for granted the possibility of continued and deliberate control of the fire 

 from the heav}' guns from some central position in action and the communication of 

 order therefrom to the several guns being as eflicient and calm as they usually are 

 under peace conditions or during battle practise. In my paper I indicated clearly 

 the opinion that neither of these conditions would be fulfilled; and no one who is 

 familiar ^vith the delicate apparatus used for communicating orders from control 

 stations to guns and batteries can believe that the apparatus would remain in order 

 long under the conditions of action. In the heat of action operators in control stations 

 can hardly be expected to perform their duties as coolly and deliberately as the)^ 

 do in peace practise ; and I am glad to note that Admiral Mahan has emphasized this 

 point forcibly and clearly. 



Admiral Capps spoke very modestly of what was done before the Michigan 

 arrangement of armament was decided upon ; but as one who is familiar with the 

 circumstances of tliat case I desire to put on record once more m}- sense of the high 

 value of the work done at that time by the United States Naval Department and 

 in particular by Admiral Capps and his staiT. It was a bold departure to make, 

 more especially after what had happened in connection with "interference" of the 

 fire of the 8-inch and 13-inch guns in the Massachusetts class but with the modifica- 

 tions the precautions introduced into the Michigan system complete success was 

 attained and that system is now rapidly becoming almost universal. 



