THE TACTICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MEN-OF- 

 WAR AND THEIR EMBODIMENT IN DESIGN. 



By Rear Admiral W. L. Rodgers, United States Navy, Associate. 



[Read at the twenty-ninth general meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, held 



in New York, November 17 and 18, 1921.] 



A paper for the Society of Naval Architects on the subject of the relation of the battle- 

 ship to other types of combatant ships is one which I am able to discuss only from a tactical 

 point of view. In the relation existing between the different classes of ships there are 

 several fundamental principles, controlling factors, which are embodied in history and experi- 

 ence. As to the steps by which the designing constructor embodies these principles in an ac- 

 ceptable design, I shall have nothing to say, as it would be beyond my capacity. But some 

 of the fundamental rules of war are of interest to us all, both as citizens and as members of 

 technical professions, and an understanding of one another's requirements and limitations 

 can only be mutually helpful in showing the interlocKing of design and of tactics. 



objective of naval effort. 



As a first point of inquiry we may ask what a navy is for. Except for fisheries the sea 

 is uninhabitable and unproductive. It is used by mankind only as a highway of commerce; 

 as a highway its control by a dominant merchant fleet enables one power to secure its own 

 economic prosperity at the expense of rivals without such control of trade routes. A domi- 

 nant merchant fleet in peace enables a nation to take a middleman's monopolistic profit of 

 world business in peace and throttle the development of a rival. In war, such a fleet sup- 

 plies a nation, while its lack may reduce a nation to want and economic defeat. We have 

 seen this exemplified very recently. 



Contrary to popular belief, combatant fleets are not built for the purpose of enjoying 

 a national championship fight to the finish. They are built for the ultimate purpose of driv- 

 ing hostile commerce from the seas and controlling neutral commerce as far as they can. 

 As a means thereto, they seek to destroy the protecting and opposing fleets of their enemy 

 to the end that, after a decisive sea battle, economic pressure on the enemy will become se- 

 vere, and greater military effort will also be possible through the use of the sea for military 

 transportation. Thus a combatant fleet should be so built that its main fighting strength 

 is in such form as may be best fitted to sweep an opposing combatant fleet from the seas. 

 This is the first step towards the goal of economic control of ocean commerce and mari- 

 time trade. 



With this object we have our main body of the fleet seeking a decision by force. But 

 our strength must be exerted intelligently. We caimot let it be ruined by surprise or misled 

 into futilities. Knowledge must precede action. 



As a distinguished German military writer says : "From knowledge to action it is always 

 a great leap, but from ignorance to action the leap is a still greater one." Our fleet must not 

 leap from ignorance into an abyss. The main strength must be guarded from surprise by 



