80 THE TACTICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT CLASSES 



arrangement. Thus we saw, in the recent war on shore, artillery and infantry mutually aid- 

 ing each other — the artillery making a position untenable and the infantry taking possession. 

 At sea, the torpedo attack by the Germans at Jutland caused Admiral Jellicoe to yield his su- 

 periority of artillery position. Thus every new weapon adds to the possible tactical combi- 

 nations and enables skill to economize in bloodshed and money with greater expense to the 

 enemy. But on the other hand, however a ship may specialize in any direction as to arma- 

 ment, it has never seemed wise to arm any ship with one weapon only. 



Every new weapon involves new methods of attack, and it requires some time for the 

 opposing force to find the appropriate way of defense. This delay raises hopes of the new 

 weapon as a decisive one. But after a little the appropriate defense is found, and when it 

 is thoroughly worked out the new weapon becomes less effective and remains as a tactical 

 auxiliary only. 



The fast ships of "position" when fighting against heavier ones, clearly need the 

 weapons of position — torpedoes, bombs — but against their equals, they need the weapon of 

 endurance — the gun — for in the end it is grit and heavy pounding, physical courage and 

 endurance that win in sea battles just as in prize fights. 



This combination of strength and endurance in attack is reached to the greatest extent 

 in battleships, yet in them it has always been thought advisable to add other arms as 

 auxiliary to the gun, rather perhaps as a defensive element, checking and cramping the ad- 

 versary's tactical style, than as an aggressive element. 



Thus, in battleships, an anti-aircraft battery will not protect against air attack, but 

 it will weaken the vigor of the attack from the air and give time for support from friendly 

 aircraft. The torpedo battery may frequently be used by battleships, but perhaps more 

 often its potential influence upon the enemy will be of tactical value. 



CONCLUSION. 



Thus, in the last analysis of ship design, we see battleships, as the most potent em- 

 bodiment of combatant strength, led, screened and informed by lighter and faster auxiliary 

 surface craft — cruisers, torpedo boats. These are further supported by the ships using the 

 third dimension of space, at the sacrifice of maneuvering safety, but gaining concealment 

 and surprise in the case of the submarine, and speed and surprise in the case of the air 

 craft. None of these auxiliaries can become dominant because they cannot remain in the 

 field of battle when properly opposed. 



The tactical principle controlling the course of the battle is fairly well fixed, although 

 variations in methods of execution will be almost infinite. The lighter speed ships will rec- 

 onnoiter and screen till in touch with each other. Then they will fight each other as 

 strength ships developing their greatest volume of fire. Next, the victorious speed ships 

 will seek to assume a "position" advantage with regard to the main body of the enemy, 

 using their speed weapons in aid of their own strength ships, and the decision will come by 

 the endurance of the strength ships. 



When the great battle is done, the battleships may go home to await another call while 

 the auxiliaries remain active to subdue hostile commerce and throttle the enem3^'s economic 

 life. These are the objectives which the naval seaman asks you to enable him to reach by 

 suitable embodiment of tactical features in the three main types of ships, namely, 

 "strength" ships and "speed" ships, and auxiliary ships movable in the third dimension. 



