86 DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE-PLANE NAVY 



serious question as to how different the results would have been had improved units been 

 subjected to the tests. It is difficult to sufficiently well assume and adopt in tests the con- 

 ditions of real warfare, and consequently to have the results of peace-time tests accepted as 

 applicable under war fighting conditions, especially if these tests are made on obsolete units. 



I believe that the opposition of ultra-conservatism to seriously consider the possibilities 

 and probabilities of aerial fighting as may affect naval developments of the near future is 

 strong, because it is difficult to boldly face new developments which mean radical changes 

 and the acceptance of the responsibility accompanying a revolution in point of view, as well 

 as in means and methods to be employed. We know that it was many years after the intro- 

 duction of steam propulsion before the necessity of completely abandoning sail for fighting 

 ships was realized, and that the importance of the evolution to follow the introduction of 

 iron as a material of construction for ships to replace wood was not quickly accepted. 



A radical change, such as a decision to immediately abandon battleship construction, 

 would seriously affect enormous vested interests and would bring forth the strong opposi- 

 tion of a great industry fighting for its existence. Many advocate the immediate adoption 

 of air forces to replace the battleship and maintain that aerial means of attack and defense 

 will be at the same time more effective and much less costly than building and keeping up 

 battleships. Evidently, the burden of proof will rest heavily on those who advocate taking 

 steps which may lead to abandoning battleship construction. It cannot be imagined that an 

 investigation and discussion of such a question will be confined to getting at the facts unless 

 special group interests and politics are omitted. 



I will briefly summarize the naval experiences of the World War, as many of them have 

 a bearing on the possibilities and probabilities of future developments. 



The unrestricted submarine warfare launched by Germany, which included the sinking 

 without warning of passenger vessels and hospital ships, as well as freighters, was for many 

 reasons a great surprise to the aUied powers, and it took considerable time before methods 

 and means of successfully combating this kind of warfare were developed and effectively 

 applied. So destructive of merchant tonnage was this use of the submarine that Germany 

 was nearly successful in destroying sufficient tonnage to stop supplies from going to England 

 and in that way probably to win the war. This destruction reached a maximum rate of about 

 875,000 tons per month in April, 1917. 



These results are recorded to have been accomplished with a comparatively small num- 

 ber of the U type of submarines of from 750 to 950 tons submerged displacement, 11 knots 

 or more surface speed, 6 to 8 knots submerged speed, carrying eight to twelve torpedoes, 

 capable of keeping at sea three or four weeks and with a cruising radius of about 5,000 to 

 6,000 miles. The last and largest boats of the U type built are reported to have a surface 

 displacement of 900 tons, with a submerged displacement of 1,300 tons and to be of greater 

 speed and increased radius of action. The records of submarine boats operating to sink mer- 

 chant vessels in the best merchant vessel hunting grounds on the approaches from the west, 

 to the Irish, English and French coasts would show that a daily average of eight to ten, 

 and always less than twenty, of the U type of submarines accomplished these sinkings; 

 also, that it was necessary for Germany to possess, in commission, either being overhauled 

 and prepared for a cruise or going back and forth between the home bases and the hunting 

 grounds, at least ten submarines for every one submarine which was engaged in making 

 sinkings. 



War records, and records obtained since the termination of the war, indicate that at no 

 time, in all fields of operation, did Germany have at sea, on any day, more than thirty sub- 



