92 DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE-PLANE NAVY 



single mine or torpedo. In many instances these ships lost stability and capsized before sink- 

 ing. The damage inflicted by mines and torpedoes to naval vessels during the war was of 

 such importance that it was found necessary to improve the protection against torpedoes 

 and mines of even the latest of the new ships still under construction. 



The destruction wrought by torpedoes and mines emphasized the value of a good mar- 

 gin of initial stability, the importance of transverse watertight subdivision and the necessity 

 of increasing lateral protection. This lateral protection includes the use of several longitu- 

 dinal bulkheads, in proximity to the outer shell, and of exterior "blisters" or "bulges." In- 

 creased initial stability and increased lateral protection call for increased beam. The beam 

 of the largest superdreadnaughts which have been built, or are now to be built, can be but 

 little increased unless the width of dry-dock gates is increased. The last of the superdread- 

 naught battleships designed for the United States Navy have a beam of about 105 feet, and 

 the width of the locks of the Panama Canal is only 1 10 feet. The war has shown the im- 

 portance of the influence of the increasing menace of the torpedo and mine on the design 

 of naval vessels. 



The Battle of Jutland shows the advantage which ships with guns of the largest cali- 

 ber and longest range have in fleet action over ships provided with smaller guns of less 

 range, also the advantage of a high angle of elevation of gunfire over smaller angles of ele- 

 vation. Increasing the angle of elevation increases both the range and the destructive efifect 

 of plunging fire. Exactly what happened in the case of the destruction and sinking of three 

 British battle cruisers of recent design is not known, but it is supposed to have been from 

 the effects of gimfire. The battle cruisers were called upon to receive more punishment from 

 artillery fire than they could withstand. In fact, in this sea fight the battle cruisers of both 

 sides bore more of the brunt of the fighting than did the battleships. The part played by 

 the battle cruisers is considered as fully justifying their existence as an essential part of a 

 fleet of capital ships, also as having proved the value of high speed in such vessels. The 

 latest superdreadnaught battleships, British and German, showed their ability to withstand 

 much punishment from artillery fire and still continue to fight. The predreadnaught type 

 of ships was found to be too vulnerable to be of use when fighting with ships of recent 

 design. 



Previous to and during the Battle of Jutland the Germans attempted to use dirigibles, 

 principally for scouting, to locate the British fleet. The British seaplane carrier was not 

 with the fleet during the battle, but one British seaplane was called upon to scout and locate 

 the ships of the enemy during the battle. Owing to low hanging clouds, fog and mist, the 

 German dirigibles were unable to locate the British ships or to keep in contact with them. 

 The British seaplane, under similar conditions, found it impossible to do the work assigned 

 to it. Low hanging clouds forced it to fly so low that it came under the fire not only of the 

 German anti-aircraft guns but also of other guns of the German ships. These experiences 

 are cited by those who claim that we must not expect that forces of the air will become an 

 important part of navies, as experiences which conclusively demonstrate the unreliability 

 of air forces under atmospheric conditions frequently lasting for days at sea. It is ad- 

 vanced by them, that, while tmder such conditions the surface fleets can fight and decide 

 the question of naval supremacy, meanwhile the air forces must be inactive and useless. 



I do not consider that the attempts to utilize air forces in this battle were made on a 

 large enough scale to make it possible to draw such general conclusions. Certainly there 

 will be atmospheric conditions afifecting visibility which will seriously handicap or prevent 

 the operations of both surface craft and aircraft. Other atmospheric conditions will favor 



