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7 
ON THE MAXIMUM DIMENSIONS OF SHIPS. 17 
put out of action. Moreover, the withdrawal of a single ship from a fleet, 
for temporary employment on detached service, would involve a serious loss 
of power, which with more numerous vessels would be avoided. 
(h) Special dangers must be incurred by the multiplication of heavy 
guns and of magazines placed below them. Some of these magazines are 
necessarily in the neighborhood of boiler-spaces or bunkers, where high tem- 
peratures are unavoidable. No doubt the dangers are lessened by fitting 
appliances for keeping magazines cool and by other devices; but although 
lessened they are not absolutely overcome and the risk of explosion—as sad 
experience proves—remains. The loss of the Liberté, which is universally 
deplored, following upon a previous accident to the Jena, demonstrate the 
possibility of possible and sudden destruction in this fashion of the largest 
ships and furnishes a fresh argument against “putting too many eggs in one 
basket.” , 
My personal conviction, based upon long-continued study of the prob- 
lem, is that the wiser course in warship building would be found in a return 
to more moderate dimensions and a reduced unit-cost for capital ships. 
Experience has established the fact that, without having resort to the 
extreme dimensions which have recently found favor, it is possible to pro- 
duce capital ships which shall be powerfully armed, well protected, steady 
gun-platforms, capable of fighting their guns in all weathers when actions 
could take place, and able to maintain their speed in rough water. The 
value of high speed in capital ships has been much discussed, but it really 
opens up a separate field into which it would be undesirable to enter now. 
Suffice it to say that with equal speed a reduction in the number of heavy 
guns carried in a single ship such as I advocated last year would enable 
considerable reductions to be made in size and cost; and that, for a given 
total expenditure on the first cost of a fleet or squadron, a more formidable 
and flexible force could, in my judgment, be obtained, with greatly reduced 
risks from either gun fire, under-water attacks or magazine explosions. It 
would probably be true, that the more numerous fleet would cost more for 
manning and maintenance, but the price which would have to be paid in 
this direction would be well earned by advantages in other respects; and 
above all by a greater prospect of success in the day of battle. 
In conclusion let me express the hope that the discussion which this 
paper is intended to provoke may have as its main result the discovery 
and record of points on which there is substantial agreement; and that it 
will put on record a clear as well as a reasoned statement of points on which 
differences of opinion exist as well as the reasons for such differences. No 
doubt, in the end, we shall have to “agree to differ” respecting some matters; 
but it will be of advantage to have minimized these differences and to know 
how far we agree. 
