30 ON THE MAXIMUM DIMENSIONS OF SHIPS. 
difficulties and with great loss of time. Moreover, the harbor entrance did not 
permit the fleet to pass in or out except at high tide. This fact was taken advantage 
of by the Japanese, who on one occasion took up a position under cover of the 
Laotieh Shan hills where the fire of the Russian batteries could not reach them, 
and at a time when the Russian fleet could not leave the harbor because it was low 
tide. From this position the Japanese carried out an indirect bombardment of 
the Russian fleet, which was lying helpless in the harbor. It was mere luck that 
the Russian ships did not suffer very serious damage on this occasion. 
These incidents, well known to naval men, show the danger in a too rapid 
growth in the size of capital ships, and the advisability of making timely and more 
liberal provisions for dock and harbor facilities. 
For the United States the Panama Canal may soon come to exert a restraint 
on further increase in beam. Capital ships are fast approaching 100-foot beam, 
which will leave a margin of only ten per cent. width in the land locks. This 
margin seems none too large, and a beam exceeding 100 feet will, for this reason, 
hardly be considered desirable for ships of the United States Navy in a near future. 
It seems therefore wise to call a halt in the increase in size of capital ships 
for the present, but on the other hand, it appears to me undesirable to take a step 
back to smaller dimensions, as proposed by the author. ‘The greatest need at 
present seems to me, as I pointed out before this Society last year, a better protec- 
tion of battleships against submarine attack and an increase in torpedo armament; 
in other words, a transition from the pure artillery ship to a type partly artillery 
and partly torpedo ship, both in point of armament and protection. Such a 
transition cannot take place concurrent with a reduction in displacement; on the 
contrary, it may be necessary even to sacrifice some of the artillery and part of 
the armor protection against artillery, in order to gain weight for the development 
of the submarine qualities and in particular, submarine armor protection, without 
an increase in displacement. 
When the construction of docks and harbors has advanced sufficiently to 
permit a further increase in displacement, I believe such increase should take place, 
but always in a conservative manner. 
On the whole, it appears to me, that this as well as other limitations to size, 
such as regards tactical and strategical flexibility, are only of a temporary, yielding 
character, being ultimately a function of time and of financial resources. The 
objection to ‘“‘putting too many eggs in one basket”’ falls to the ground, if the 
number of baskets remains the same or is increased, as was actually the case when 
“Dreadnoughts” were introduced. Size in itself is not objectionable on this 
ground, but only if it entails a reduction in number. The navy of each country 
will here find its limit for the time being, but this limit cannot be said to be of an 
absolute character. 
An absolute barrier to the construction of larger and larger units seems to be 
found only in the eventual stronger development of the submarine means of attack, 
in particular of the submarine vessel which may some day be capable of driving 
