COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 11 



NEW RADAE DEVELOPMENT, APS 9 5 



There is also a new development which is pertinent here. We are 

 proceeding to install a new radar aboard the early warning and con- 

 trol aircraft, a radar called the APS 95 which possesses a greatly im- 

 proved capability over anything we have had before. Also we are in- 

 stalling a new transistorized airborne long-range input system in 

 these aircraft, which will permit the automatic transmission of data 

 to the SAGE system. And so in a sense these aircraft will perform 

 the type of a function that was previously performed by these Texas 

 towers. 



So the combination of these facts has led to the decision it would not 

 be worthwhile to resurrect a program of this type at the present time. 



NEED FOR THE TOWERS IN THE FUTURE 



Senator Stennis. Well, I am glad that you are capable of going into 

 that, because that is one thing the full connnittee has already told us 

 informally that they want to know about — the need for these towers 

 in the first place, the continued use of them, and the need for them in 

 the future. We have had a great deal of testimony about the very 

 matters you mentioned, that is, about improvements in the radar 

 systems. 



Now, just flatly, you do not propose to replace Texas tower No. 4. 

 ^Vliat about withdrawing the use of the others ? What are your plans 

 on that? 



Mr. Charyk. If the installation of the APS 95 radar and the ALRI 

 equipment on our early warning aircraft proves out as we exj^ect at the 

 present time, we would anticipate that we would abandon the opera- 

 tion of Texas toAvers 2 and 3 at that time. 



Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. Counsel, do you have further 

 questions ? 



Mr. Kendall. One further question. Dr. Charyk, at what stage 

 was tower No. 1 eliminated ? 



Mr. Charyk. Substantially the same time period. 



Senator Stennis. What is that ? 



Mr. Charyk. Substantially the same time period as I discussed 

 earlier. Namely, there was a deferral to the following year at the 

 time the construction was authorized for towers 3 and 4 ; funding dif- 

 ficulties and priorities led to the decision for further deferral in the 

 following year. Subsequently it was decided not to proceed with the 

 construction. 



Mr. EJENDALL. But you took bids for No. 1 at the same time you took 

 bids for towers 3 and 4. 



Mr. Charyk. It was anticipated that reduced costs might be en- 

 countered which would permit the construction of 1, 3, and 4 within 

 the funds available. When the bids were received, it was clear that 

 constiiiction would be possible for only two of the towers, and the 

 decision was made to proceed with 3 and 4, which were the highest 

 priority installations. 



Mr. Kendall. Well, how much did the Air Force have in its budget 

 for the construction of those three towers at that time — 1, 3, and 4? 



70733—61 2 



