Analj/sis of Dr. Hancock^s theory. 79 



of the end and design of such ac(s, perhaps as much so as many of 

 our fellow-creatures are, when lending their assistance to us in the 

 same way," — and if at the same time " they are not bound by the 

 obligation of any moral duties," — it is evident they must be the 

 conscious subjects of that superior principle of rational intuition by 

 which the author distinguishes man, with this incompatible addi- 

 tion, that they are no< accountable agents. — Is not this (contrary 

 no doubt to the author's intention) confounding the nature of Man 

 and Brute? According to these principles the dog who plunges 

 into the water and rescues a poor human being from death, has a 

 consciousness of the act, the same in kind with that of the savage, 

 who performs a similar action ; and who, although, if brought into 

 civilized society, he may " frequently act without having any clear 

 knowledge of the complicated means or end, which the superior 

 understanding, whatever it is, to which he submits himself, has in 

 view," is yet capable of acquiring such knowledge and superior 

 understanding ; while the brute under similar circumstances re- 

 mains fixed in the station which he previously occupied. 



The conclusions then, drawn by Dr. Hancock, respecting the 

 conscious principles which actuate Brutes in instances like the 

 foregoing being the same which actuate human beings themselves, 

 shews that he considers the consciousness of both to be the same 

 in kind under similar circumstances. But the ambiguity and con- 

 fusion which such an opinion involves, may be seen in the following 

 paragraph, which leaves the mind in doubt and distraction as to 

 the limit it essays to define. 



At page 9Qy we read : — ^' On taking a review of most, if 

 not all, the actions of the lower animals we have been last con- 

 sidering, I think it must be obvious, that whether we allow them 

 reason or not, the actions themselves comprehend those elements of 

 Reason, if I may so speak, which we commonly refer to rational 

 beings. So that if the same actions had been done by our fellow- 

 creatures, we should have ascribed them without hesitation to 

 motives and feelings worthy of a rational nature. It is certain 

 that most of these animals in their several rational acts (if I may 

 call them such) show every outward sign of consciousness or know- 

 ledge of the end of their actions — a consciousness, too, immediately 



