82 Mr. French on the nature of Instinct. 



To me therefore, it appears, that such examples as those ad- 

 duced, prove much more than can be included in the limitation, 

 ■which the theory adopted by Dr. Hancock respecting the reason- 

 ing power of Brutes prescribes ; they prove, for instance, that 

 Brutes as well as Man are in the conscious possession of " primitive 

 ideas and rules of true and false," " common sense," and lastly, 

 " moral sentiment," or the emotions which give rise to the know- 

 ledge of right and wrong, good and evil — all which are included in 

 the most enlarged sense of the term Reason, as defined by the au- 

 thor in page 226. 



In treating of " Education," Dr. Hancock justly says, (p. 292.) 

 " Whatever [impression] is received from without, must have a 

 connatural afl&nity with some primary taste, capacity, or feeling 

 within." — " Every intetiial power has also its object in its external 

 relations, and external impressions can never produce a practical 

 effect further than they quicken, rouse, and animate the internal 

 power to which they are appropriate and upon which they act" Now 

 if this be true of Man it is also true of Brutes, if a rational con- 

 sciousness be connected with their acts ; and if the internal prin- 

 ciples necessary to such acts be thus rationalin the enlarged sense 

 of the term Reason^ the consciousness of the agent must be in a 

 like degree rational. This, however, would be to humanize the 

 Brute, and raise him from that station which is inevitably assigned 

 to him. 



Are actions of the nature of the above-mentioned to be referred 

 to that class, of which the author in his definition says — " if there 

 be any actions which are performed with every indication of de- 

 sign, forethought, and wisdom, which are not the result of instruc- 

 tion, nor of individual experience, but of a power acting above the 

 consciousness of the creature, and directing it with unerring cer- 

 tainty to some specific ends, by means far above its comprehension, 

 whether in Man or in Brute ; these actions are instinctive "? 



Or are those and similar acts, forming as Dr. Hancock observes, 

 not rare exceptions, or anomalous occurrences, but matters of 

 course, — to be referred to that class to which he refers them 

 when he says, " they do not belong to Instinct," and of which he 

 observes in his definition — " If there be any actions, which evi- 



