164 Mr. French on the nature of Instinct. 



Art. XIX. An Inquiry into the true nature of Instinct, 

 and of the Mental Distinction between Brute Animals 

 and Man. Essay III. On the Specific Constitution of 

 the Brute Mind, and its modifications under Human In- 

 fluence : including an analysis of the theory of Brute 

 Action contained in Dr. Hancock's " Essay on Instinct, 

 and its Physical and Moral Relations.'' By JoH^f 

 Oliver French, Esq. 



[Continued from page 83.] 



There are, however, other considerations which enter into this 

 portion of the subject. It would appear from the passage last 

 quoted, as well as from his general views, that the author considers 

 the Ideas and Memory of the Brute Animal as being altogether 

 similar in their nature to the Ideas and Memory of Man : but he 

 no where specifically discusses this point. I am, however, in- 

 clined to think that, in this respect, Brutes live in a mental world 

 of their own, modified by their peculiar consciousness. But as the 

 inquiry is connected with that of the supposed capability in brutes 

 of a rational understanding of language ; I shall consider these in- 

 quiries together, in adverting to the nature of the impressions 

 produced by man upon domesticated animals. 



The philosophy of the most barbarous language is formed : — 

 1. Upon the consciousness of our own identity or individual exist- 

 ence. 2. Upon the consciousness of the existence of the exter- 

 nal world around us. 3. Upon the consciousness of action or 

 cause ; — hence of a first or primary cause. — If I am not capable of 

 a consciousness of the first, in an objective form ; thus, if the con- 

 stitution of my being is such that I cannot ever say to myself, " / 

 am ;" in this case, I cannot possess the capability of ever becoming 

 conscious of the second j or of saying to myself, with respect to the 

 external world — " that is." If I possess the capability of becom- 

 ing conscious of the first and second ; or of saying to myself, " I 

 am," and " that is," — I am obviously capable of becoming con- 

 scious of the third, or of saying to myself, " Whence am I," and 



