Mr. French on the nature of Instinct. 



says ' come here,' he means that I am to move from where I am, 

 and go to the spot where he is," — as included in the proposition, 

 " come here"; which however would be the case were he capable 

 of a rational understanding of these words. The perception of 

 the animal may be accounted for from other principles, which will 

 be adverted to as we proceed. 



Let us now, for the sake of illustration, concede to Brutes a 

 supposed power of reasoning, and a memory similar in all respects 

 to that of Man, and endeavour to trace from these premises, what, 

 in such cases, must be the nature of their ideas ; and if it 

 should appear, upon this mode of investigation, that these are 

 such as cannot with propriety be ascribed to brutes, it will follow 

 that there are grounds to conclude, that both their ideas and 

 discrimination of objects must be different as to consciousness from 

 the ideas and discriminations of Man. 



Dr. Hancock does, indeed, very consistently, allow to Brutes 

 the power of abstraction. In page 110, he observes, " Locke is 

 not disposed to allow them the power of abstraction. It is how- 

 ever well observed by the writer of the article Instinct, in Recs' 

 Cyclopaedia, that ' there are many facts from which it is evident, 

 that brutes on some occasions exhibit proofs of this faculty.' And 

 to this opinion (says Dr. Hancock) I assent." And with this 

 consequence I myself also agree, namely, that if they reason at 

 all, they must reason abstractedly ; or, in other words, they must 

 possess a knowledge of the qualities of things whereon to exercise 

 their reasoning. How, for instance, can a brute reason upon the 

 nature of any object before him, and not be at the same time able 

 to perceive its relations of length, breadth, thickness, or colour, 

 with respect to other objects ? and how can he reason upon a par- 

 ticular sound, without perceiving the relation of its key or pitch 

 in comparison with the key or pitch of other sounds ? If he pro- 

 ceeds by reason, in the formation of his knowledge, these relations 

 are necessary to him. The merest savage is acquainted with 

 them, — reasonably so, — and is capable of extending his rational 

 knowledge upon such subjects to all the Laws of Geometry, 

 of Light, and of Sound. 



Admit that animals possess this reasoning power, and a volun- 



