170 Mr. French on the nature of Instinct. 



as with respect to the square and the circle. Under the iDfluence 

 of a particular perception or instinctive impulse, he may indeed 

 discriminate acutely between either ; but his distinctions vanish 

 with the occasion. Thus, with respect to difference of colour, 

 he compares not between a red object and a blue, as being either 

 red or blue, and if he has a preference, it is instinctive ; be has 

 no notion of colour, as such ; or, in other words, the idea of 

 colour does not become objective to his mind, because this pos- 

 sesses no ability to recognise the differences or relations of objects, 

 with respect to their colour, — by any proper conscious power. 

 If Brutes are thus incapable of a rational apprehension of qua- 

 lity, their ideas must be extremely simple in their nature, — the 

 results of a peculiar species of perception adapted to the station 

 they are designed to fill in creation ; their discriminations being 

 exercised on such simple modes of perception, must also, as to 

 their consciousness, partake of this simple character, notwith- 

 standing they may be vivid and strong. Their impressions, though 

 distinctly enough perceived, must be to themselves intellectually 

 obscure, or rather, dark : — thus their idea of a man, a tree, or 

 other objects, will differ from that of man himself, by being non- 

 rational in its nature. No one, for instance, who carefully weighs 

 the matter, will suppose that a Dog, who recognises his master 

 with more precision than is evinced by a rational acquaintance, 

 has any human idea of his master as a Man ; or that he has any 

 other thaiji a vague perception concerning him, as of a being 

 whom he finds himself constrained to love and obey. — And in 

 this it is clear he is led by an influence which he can neither un- 

 derstand nor controul. And hence it appears — That any rational 

 perceptions of the differences in objects must be effected by a 

 species of acquaintance with their qualities of which brutes are in- 

 capable ; and that without such acquaintance with their qualities, 

 they can have no rational apprehension concerning the things them- 

 • selves : — thus that the conscious impressions or ideas which are 

 conceived from the action of the senses upon external objects in a 

 being incapable of reflecting upon the qualities of such objects, 

 must necessarily be of a nature diftercnt from the conscious im- 



