THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL POLICIES ON SHIPS' DESIGN. 69 



England began to compete with that of Spain and the attacks of Drake and other 

 great English seamen had driven Spain beyond endurance, it was with the some- 

 what unsuitable types of Portuguese ships, reinforced by a few of the largest and 

 finest of the Mediterranean galleys, totally unsuited to an ocean campaign, that 

 Spain set out for the English Channel. 



On the opposing side all was different. England was just beginning to rise 

 in maritime commerce. Everything was progressive, for she felt the need of strug- 

 gling to force herself into "a place in the sun." Unlike Spain, she had only one 

 field of effort, the ocean ; her ships were designed to overcome the Spanish ships ; 

 they were faster, new inventions permitted them to sail closer to the wind, and they 

 carried their heavy long-range batteries on the broadside. 



The English leaders were prepared to use their ships to the best advantage. 

 They had fought the Spanish before and they knew that the latter were resting on 

 their past achievements, seeking no improvement. 



At last the Spanish fleet appeared in the Channel with ships of two different 

 types originally designed to support the two national policies of Spain, with leaders 

 wedded to the ram tactics of the smooth Mediterranean, and the fleet in line, in 

 the ramming formation. The English met the attack with a homogeneous fleet of 

 a type suited to the English policy, in waters to which the English fleet was 

 adapted. The English tactical formation was column suitable for developing 

 the superiority of the batteries at long range. The victory fell to the side which 

 deserved it through the singleness of purpose reflected both in the design of the 

 ships and in the tactics of the admirals. 



Again we must notice how the design of the ships is the issue of respective 

 national policies. The national spirit led Spain to unprogressiveness, and England 

 to every improvement in material, whose use the leaders thoroughly incorporated 

 in their tactical schemes. A far-sighted policy supported the genius of England's 

 admirals. 



Passing over another three centuries we come to our own Civil War. The out- 

 break occurred at the period of transition from sails to steam as motive power, 

 and when iron was beginning to replace wood in the construction of vessels. The 

 United States had few ships of any sort. The Federal Government at once em- 

 braced the national policy of throttling the commercial life of the Confederacy by 

 a maritime blockade while armies occupied the insurgent territory. Every sort of 

 ship was seized upon to execute this policy, but a chief part fell to the monitors. 

 In these ships Ericsson's invention of the revolving gun turret was mounted on a 

 ship design suitable to the blockade of the shallow waters and sandy coasts of the 

 Southern States. The development was entirely suited to its purpose, but the close 

 of the war found the country in possession of a fleet suited to peculiar conditions, 

 the outcome of a pre-existing political situation. 



The country at large, and indeed the Navy, took little heed of the special 

 maritime features of the war, and like the Spaniards after Lepanto, concluded that 

 the ships which had given satisfaction once, necessarily would do so again. So the 



