THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL POLICIES ON SHIPS' DESIGN. 71 



American seas against possible transatlantic enemies. Consequently, the Depart- 

 ment, in selecting a design on which to spend the appropriation of the year, con- 

 sidered that the Blenheim type was about the best that it could see for the Navy 

 and proceeded to attempt to improve on it. The result was the New York, a very 

 fine ship from the shipbuilder's point of view, but a misfit from the national point 

 of view, because she was a commerce protector. The United States had no ocean 

 commerce to be protected. The New York was a very superior British craft, but 

 a poor American one. A year or two later, the Navy Department in its search for 

 ship design, and apparently with the wish to have every sort of tool in its kit, pro- 

 duced two ships of the French type, the Columbia and Minneapolis. As in the case 

 of the New York, there were no ships of the type superior to these "Pirates," as 

 they were called, yet they also were misfits for America. Owing to America's lack 

 of coaling stations and general inferiority in naval power there was no probability 

 that these ships could accomplish anything serious against hostile commerce. 



But at this same time the report of the so-called "Endicott Board" on coast 

 defense, made in 1886 and based on a full consideration of national requirements, 

 had borne fruit. The first of our present battleship fleet was already begun. In 

 these ships national policies controlled the design and we have continued to develop 

 this type. 



It may be interesting to show the method which the Navy Department now 

 follows in order to check aberrations of ship design which may result in excellent 

 specimens of naval architecture unsuited to the needs of the country. All the great 

 powers take steps with the same purpose of controlling naval design to suit policy. 



The close of the Spanish war showed that the organization of the Navy De- 

 partment was very incomplete in that it was not based upon the requirements of 

 war, but upon those of the routine of peace, and further, the various branches of 

 the Department were semi-independent and did not co-ordinate with each other as 

 they should even for the daily demands of administration in times of peace. More- 

 over, the existing branches of the Navy Department were wholly absorbed in their 

 own administrative duties, and so were unable to take a wide outlook upon naval 

 affairs in general and their relation to the country at large. 



As a partial remedy for this condition the Secretary of the Navy established 

 a board of officers of high rank sitting permanently in Washington which was 

 named the "General Board," whose duties were to be entirely non-administrative, 

 but which were to study, deliberate and report upon all large questions of naval 

 policy as derived from national policy, so that this board could indicate the gen- 

 eral direction of naval effort, leaving all details of execution to the administrative 

 bureaus responsible therefor. 



Among other duties assigned to the Board by the Navy Regulations is that of 

 studying the naval policies of other countries for comparison with our own and rec- 

 ommending numbers and types of ships which the Navy needs in order to be able 

 to maintain our national policies in the face of opposition. A further duty of the 

 Board is to study and report upon the military characteristics desirable in the 

 various types of ships it recommends. 



