76 GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF NAVY YARD DESIGN. 



II. CAPACITY. 



This includes: — 



( 8 ) Capacity to keep the fleet in repair in time of war. 



( 9 ) Capacity to keep the fleet in repair in time of peace. 



(10) Capacity to keep the fleet supplied in time of war. 



( 1 1 ) Capacity to keep the fleet supplied in time of peace. 



(12) Capacity to build ships of the largest size. 



(13) Capacity to quickly repair ships under all conditions of injury and 

 draught. 



(14) Capacity to berth, repair, and supply at one time a very large number 

 of ships of the largest size. 



III. COST OF CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION. 



This includes: — 



(15) Cost of yard and plant. 



(16) Cost of maintenance. 



(17) Cost of operation, which involves: 



(a) Efficiency of operation as regards speed of doing work under vary- 

 ing conditions of weather and volume of work. 



(b) Efficiency of operation as regards cost of doing work under varying 

 conditions of weather and volume of work. 



I. SUITABILITY OF LOCATION. 



Taking the various requirements in succession, we find with respect to (i), 

 that the position of New York is superior to all ports on the coast as regards 

 depth of water and ordinary ease of exit and entrance, with the single exception 

 of Narragansett Bay. It is the only port on our whole coast which has two en- 

 trances separated by 100 miles. It is nearly in the industrial center of the coast. 

 It is somewhat farther from Europe than Narragansett Bay, but the difference is 

 so small as to be immaterial, while it is a little nearer to the Panama Canal. 



As regards (2), it is easy of defense against sea attack, as compared with 

 Narragansett Baj^ and, furthermore. New York is always likely to be incompar- 

 ably the best defended port on the coast, its great interests and the character of 

 its entrance both contributing to this end. A navy yard located at the place in- 

 dicated in the accompanying drawing is a mile or two farther away from possible 

 sea attack than the present yard. And it is far more secure against a landing 

 force than any location on Long Island, or almost any other practicable location in 

 New York harbor, or elsewhere. As against a naval raid, its security is practically 

 absolute, while any conceivable location in Narragansett Bay is peculiarly open to 

 this form of attack. 



As regards (3) the accessibility under all conditions of tide, wind, and tem- 

 perature, the low- water depth in the entrance channels of New York has, for fifty 



