78 GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF NAVY YARD DESIGN. 



men continuously employed would be available. Men will not go far for employ- 

 ment lasting only a few days or even weeks. Sudden and temporary increase of 

 force in an emergency would be impossible. Greatly increased wages might bring 

 mechanics after considerable delay and much trouble ; but labor offices would have 

 to be opened and maintained in New York and Boston. Labor difficulty alone 

 should preclude us from attempting to place a yard on which the fleet (or even a 

 portion of it) depends for repairs and maintenance at any great distance from a 

 source of supply of labor of all kinds and in any quantity. 



As regards the liberty of the enlisted force, the desirability of having a navy 

 yard adjacent to a large city is of the utmost importance if we are to keep them 

 contented, unless we waste time by giving liberty in one place and at one time and 

 sacrifice a further length of time for repairs at some other point. Such an ar- 

 rangement is wasteful of the time of both officers and men, and cuts down the time 

 available for drill and training and extends the interval of inefficiency. No other 

 place compares with New York for the purpose of liberty-giving, and a navy yard 

 should exist there large enough to berth the whole fleet. An attempt to keep battle- 

 ships at anchor in the North River and similar places in winter invariably results in 

 the drowning of members of the crews and loss of steam launches and other boats. 



II. CAPACITY. 



As already stated, it seems perfectly clear that one navy yard should, if 

 possible, be large enough to quickly repair the whole organized fleet in time of 

 war. The separation of the fleet into three or four parts for any reason whatso- 

 ever is strategically wrong. No vessels should be separated from the main body of 

 the fleet except such as are so badly injured that they will be out of service for 

 many weeks or months. The strategy points to the establishment of the largest 

 kind of a yard in the best possible location with the best possible defenses. 



The great central yard should be large enough to keep the whole active fleet 

 in repairs during peace as well as war. A large establishment is much more effi- 

 cient and economical than several small ones. If the smaller yards serve no useful 

 purpose in war they are equally inefficient in time of peace and should no longer be 

 maintained. 



As regards (lo) and (ii) (the capacity for supplies in time of peace and 

 war), it is perfectly apparent that if we put a navy yard in a place like Narragan- 

 sett Bay we must run the risk of failing to provide supplies at a critical moment 

 or have enormous storehouses in the navy yard. In the latter case the losses 

 from deterioration of stores will be very considerable. A navy yard located in 

 New York harbor need have comparatively small storage capacity, for the ware- 

 houses and storehouses of the whole city are so close as to render them an annex 

 to the yard. 



The capacity to build ships of the largest size is a necessary feature of a great 

 navy yard, and is not a very expensive addition to a great repair plant unless 

 the considerable area of ground necessary is costly owing to high value of land. 



