’ 
65 
“ The army and militia, together with the marine, consti- 
tute the vital principle of the system. 
“From this sketch it is apparent that our system of de- 
fence is composed of elements whose numerous reciprocal 
relations with each other and with the whole constitute its 
excellence; one element is scarcely more dependent than 
the whole system is on any one. Withdraw the navy, and the 
defence becomes merely passive; withdraw interior commu- 
nications from the system, and the navy must cease in a 
measure to be active for want of supplies, and the fortifica- 
tions can offer but a feeble resistance for want of timely 
reinforcements; withdraw fortifications, and there only re- 
mains a scattered and naked navy.” 
The relation of the navy to fortifications is one of those 
subjects not always well appreciated, and hence the cause of 
mischievous notions and much misrepresentation. No pains 
is spared in these reports to make this subject clearly under- 
stood. After the quotation just given, Colonel Totten re- 
marks : — 
“It is necessary to observe, in the first place, that the 
relations of fortifications to the navy in a defensive system 
is that of a sheltering, suecoring power, while the relation of 
the latter to the former is that of an active and powerful 
auxiliary; and that the latter ceases to be efficient as a 
ee of the system the moment it becomes passive, and 
Id in no case (we allude to the navy proper) be relied 
‘on as a substitute for fortifications. This position may be 
easily established. 
“Tf our navy be inferior to » that of the enemy, it can afford, 
of course, unaided by fortifications, but a feeble resistance, 
single ships being assailed by whole fleets; if it be equal, or 
superior, having numerous points along an extended frontier 
to protect, and being unable to concentrate, because ignorant 
6* 
