66 
of the selected point of attack, every point must be simul- 
taneously guarded: our separate squadrons may therefore be’ 
captured in detail by the concentrated fleet of the attacking 
power. If we attempt to concentrate under an idea that @ 
favorite object of the enemy is foreseen, he will not fail to 
push his forces upon the places thus left without protection. 
This mode of defence is liable to the further objections of 
being exposed to fatal disasters, although not engaged with 
an enemy, and of leaving the issue of ‘conflict often to be 
determined by accident, in spite of all the efforts of courage 
and skill. If it were attempted to improve upon this mode 
by adding temporary batteries and field works, it would be 
found that besides being weak and inadequate from. their 
nature, the most suitable positions for these works must often 
be neglected, under a necessary condition of the plan, that 
the ships themselves be defended ; otherwise they must either 
take no part in the contest, or be destroyed by the superior 
adversary.” 
It is hardly to be expected that a system affording 50 much 
room for discussion, and by its importance inviting it, should, 
especially in this country, escape adverse judgment. Mili- 
tary and naval men, congressmen, and even cabinet officers 
have assailed it, called in question the principles on which it 
is based, or denied the judiciousness of their application 
The forms and sources of assault have been varied, but 
there has been really no great difference in the substance, of 
which, perhaps, as good an expression as any may be found 
in these dogmas, forming the pith of a criticism from 7° _ 
@ source than the Secretary of War, Mr. Cass, approved by 
the President, General Jackson : — 
“1st. That for the defence of the coast, the chief reliance 
should be on the Navy. 
- 2d. That in preference to fortifications, floating batteries 
should be introduced wherever they can be used. 
