68 
inferior to the enemy, there would be no reason to look for a 
successful defence ; and as there would be no escape for the 
defeated vessels, the presence of the fleet, instead of avert- 
ing the issue, would only render it the more calamitous. 
“Should our fleet be equal to the enemy’s, the defence might 
be complete, and it probably would be so. Still, hazard, 
some of the many mishaps liable to attend contests of this 
nature, might decide against us; and in that event, the con- 
sequences would be even more disastrous than on the pre- 
ceding supposition. In this case the chances of victory to 
the two parties would be equal, but the consequences very 
_ unequal. It might be the enemy’s fate to lose his whole 
fleet, but he could lose nothing more ; while we ina similar 
attempt would lose not only the whole fleet, but also the 
object that the fleet was designed to protect. 
“Tf superior to the enemy, the defence of the port would _ 
in all respects be complete. But instead of making an at- 
tack, the enemy would, in such case, employ himself in cut- 
ting up our commerce on the ocean ; and nothing could be 
done to. protect this commerce without leaving the port m4 
condition to be successfully assailed. 
“In either of the above cases, the fleet might await the 
enemy in front of the harbor, instead of lying within. But 
ho advantage is apparent from such arrangement, and yet 
would be superadded the risk of being injured by tempests; 
and thereby being disqualified for the duty of defence, oF of 
being driven off the coast by gales of wind; thus for a time 
removing all opposition. 
“In the same cases, also, especially when equal or sU- 
perior to the enemy, our fleet, depending on having correct 
nd timely notice as to the position and state of preparation 
of the enemy’s forces, might think proper to meet him at 
the outlet of his own port, or intercept him on his way: 
- ™~ 
