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instead of awaiting him, within or off our own harbor. 
Here it must be noticed that the enemy, like ourselves, 
is supposed to possess a single harbor only ; but having 
protected it by other means, that his navy is disposable for 
offensive operations. If it were attempted thus to shut 
him within his own port, he, in any case but that of decided 
inferiority, would not hesitate to come out and risk a battle ; 
because if defeated, he could retire under shelter of his 
defences to refit, and if successful, he could proceed with 
4 small portion of his foree—even a single vessel would 
suifice —to the capture of our port now defenceless, while, 
With the remainder, he would follow up his advantage over 
our defeated vessels, not failing to pursue into their harbor, 
should they return thither. 
“Actual superiority on our part would keep the enemy 
from volunteering a battle; but it would be indispensable 
that the superiority be steadily maintained, and that the 
Superior fleet be constantly present. If driven off by tem- 
Pests, or absent from any other cause, the blockaded fleet 
Would escape, when it would be necessary for our fleet to 
fly back to the defence of its own port. Experience 
abundantly proves, moreover, that it is in vain to attempt 
to shut a hostile squadron in port for any length of time. 
It Seems, then, that whether we defend by remaining at 
* home, or by shutting the enemy’s fleet within his own 
harbor, actual superiority in vessels is indispensable to the 
Security of our own port. 
“With this superiority, the defence will be complete, 
Provided our fleet remains within its harbor. But then, 
all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be 
left to its fate 3; and no attempt can be made to react of- 
ively against the foe, unless we can control the chances 
of finding the enemy’s fleet within his port, and the still 
