70 
more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape 
of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our 
harbor. Let us next see what will be the state of the 
question on the supposition of numerous important ports 
on either side, instead of a single one; relying on our 
part still exclusively on a navy. 
“In order to examine this question, we will supposé 
our adversary to be fortified in all his harbors, and pos 
sessed of available naval means, equal to our own. This 
is certainly a fair supposition; because what is assumed 
as regards his harbors is true of all maritime nations, 
except the United States; and as regards naval means, it 
is elevating our own strength considerably above its pres 
ent measure, and above that it is likely to attain for years 
“ Being thus relatively situated, the first difference that 
strikes us is, that the enemy, believing all his ports to 
be safe without the presence of his vessels, sets himself 
at once about making our’ seas and shores the theatre 
of operations, while we are left without choice in the mat 
ter; for if he thinks proper to come, and we are not pre 
ent, he attains his object without resistance. : 
“The next difference is, that while the enemy (sa¥!93 
only the opposition of Providence) is certain to fall upo? 
the single point, or the many points he may have selected, 
ere will exist no previous indications of his partic 
choice, and, consequently, no reason for preparing oUF 
defence on one point rather than another; so that 
chances of not being present and ready on his arrival at° 
directly in proportion to the number of our ports, that * 
to say, the greater the number of ports, the greater the 
number of’ chances that he will meet no opposition what- 
ever. . 
Another difference is, that the enemy can choose the 
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