17 
“Had the English expedition of 1814, attended by a 
squadron of armed steamers, arrived at the mouth of the 
Mississippi, a few transports might have been taken in tow, 
and in a few hours the whole army would have been before 
the city. Or twelve or fifteen such steamers could have 
carried the whole army up in half a day, without the delay 
of transports. Will it be contended that the attack in that 
form would have been repulsed with the means then in 
General Jackson’s hands? Would the landing, or even the 
presence on board these steamships, of the British troops 
have been necessary to burn the city or put it under contri- 
bution? Is there anything now, but the existence of forts 
on the river, to prevent the success of such an attack by fif- 
teen or twenty steamers of war, allured there by the vastly 
increased magnitude of the spoil ?” * 
While the enemy’s means of attack are thus enhanced by 
the use of war-steamers, General Totten contends that they 
cannot be relied upon, as a Substitute for fortifications, for 
defence. ' 
“TI do not assert,” he says, “that armed vessels would 
not be useful in coast defence. Such an idea would be 
absurd. T shall even have occasion to show a necessity for 
this kind of force, in certain exceptional cases. It is the 
general proposition, viz. that armed vessels, and not fortifi- 
cations, are the proper defences for our vulnerable points, — 
a proposition the more dangerous, because seemingly in such 
accordance with the well-tried prowess and heroic achieve- 
ments of the navy that we have now to controvert. 
* The experience of the Rebellion has proved the trath # General 
Totten’s words. The moment the forts were passed, the city of New 
Orleans Was, notwithstanding the land forees unde 
modore Farragut’s mercy. I have alluded elsewhere to the failure 
of the forts. 3 
7* : 
