78 
“ Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, 
and New Orleans are, we will suppose, to be guarded, not by 
forts, but by these vessels, on the occurrence of a war with 
a nation possessing large naval means. We know that it is 
no effort for such nations to despatch a fleet of twenty line- 
of-battle ships and frigates, or an equal number of war 
steamers, or even the combined mass, — both fleets in one. 
“ What, then, shall we do at the above-named ports several- 
ly? Each is justly felt to be an object worthy of an enemy's 
efforts, and each would be culpable in sending elsewhere any 
part of the force required for its own defence. Each, there- 
fore, maintains a naval force equal, at least, to that the enemy 
is judged to be able to send promptly against it. Omitting 
any provision for other places scarcely less important, what 
is the result? It is, that we maintain within the harbors of, 
or at the entrance to, these places, chained down to this pas- 
sive defence, a force at least six times as large as that of the 
enemy. 
“ He does not hesitate to leave his port, because it will be 
protected in his absence by its fortifications, which also afford 
him a sure refuge on his return. He sails about the ocean, 
depredating upon our commerce with his privateers and 
small cruisers, putting our small places to ransom, and in 
other ways following up appropriate duties ; all which is ac- 
complished without risk, because our fleet, although of enor 
mous magnitude, must cling to ports which have no other 
defence than that afforded by their presence. They cannot 
combine against him singly, for they cannot know where he 
is; and must not, moreover, abandon ‘the object which they 
were expressly provided to guard. 
“It would really seem that there could not be a more im- 
politic, inefficient, and dangerous system, as there could not 
certainly be a more expensive one.” 
