90 
own devices as to much that relates to the interior arrange- 
ments. The wood-work of magazines, inadequately venti- 
lated, had rotted and fallen in ruins; the covering of the 
bombproof casemates, imperfectly understood, had failed to 
exclude water, which percolated through the piers and 
arches or gathered in muddy pools on the floors. The work 
to be done to bring the forts to speedy efficiency was vast; 
embrasures and floors of casemates were to be raised to 
compensate the settlement the works had undergone; earth 
to be removed from the arches, in order to repair or renew “si 
roofing; magazines and quarters to be refitted, and all this 
before a gun could be mounted in a proper manner. On all 
these points Colonel Totten was rich in the experience of = 
long researches, and ready at once to give the proper di- 
rections. Following his detailed instructions, the works 
speedily reached such a condition of efficiency : as to permit 
the mounting and service of their guns.* 
What the writer here relates from his own experience at 
New Orleans serves but to illustrate the indefatigable labors 
and personal agency of Colonel Totten at this period, along 
the whole seaboard of the United States, in bringing all its 
ports and harbors into a defensible condition. Nor should I 
confine these attributes to any particular During 
the whole time of his Chief Engineership he aaa the 
same laborious supervision. Generally, once in about every 
two years, he inspected every fort of the United States, and 
scarcely was the local engineer officer more thoroughly 
familiar with each detail of his own particular works than 
* When Forts Jackson and Philip on the Mississippi i were attacked 
‘by the fleets of Commanders Farragut and Porter, they were not pro- 
ided with the armaments intended for them, and the garrisons wer? 
demoralized by a long bombardment. It is not in place to discuss this 
“subject here. 
