242 REV. H. J. CLARKE. 
goodness. All a man can be expected to do is to be well in advance 
of, or in harmony with, the best ideas of his day. Plato had not got 
to the stand-point of people who consider the interests of the lower 
animals or slaves. That, of course, he was defective in; but I do 
not think that he is to be blamed for that; and I want to point out 
that his idea of goodness was really, to a very great extent, nearly 
the same as our own, and surely, to a great extent, the same as 
that of Christianity. The author explains that philosophers prior 
to Plato had all been explaining the origin of the universe on 
physical grounds. He himself says, ‘‘ Let us declare the cause 
which led the Supreme Ordainer to produce and compose the 
universe. He was good ; and He who is good has no kind of envy. 
Exempt from envy, He wished that all things should be as much as 
possible like Himself.” That is surely a central attribute of the 
Divine Being—goodness. I think the words of the author, on 
page 256, admit of some modification: “ Aristotle, accordingly, 
assumed the existence of something which he designated tA.” 
But surely the author does not seek to distinguish Aristotle from 
Plato on that ground, for they both assumed that. One point 
the author omitted, I think, as regards Plato and Aristotle, is, 
that they both regarded matter as eternal; even Milton did 
this. I will pass over all I could say, for it would take me far too 
long to express my opinions on those matters in which I agree 
with the author in his admirable paper. I will next speak of the 
Stoics, to whom I think the author of the paper has not done justice. 
No doubt there was a great deal of, I will not say false profession, 
among the Stoics, but a great deal of inconsistency among them, as 
the author will admit there is among Christians and all religionists ; 
but I think that the remark he makes towards the close of page 
258 is too sweeping, viz. :—“ Now, I venture to think we shall 
be doing no injustice to the virtues of such Stoics as Epictetus, if 
we take for granted, as assuredly we must, that the sort of 
apathy affected by the members of this school was, in its relation 
to life’s busy cares and pleasures, a flattering ideal, much more 
largely productive of elevated moral precepts and choice aphorisms, 
and a transparently self-conscious dignity of deportment, than of 
‘truth in the inward parts,’ or even of veritable illustrations of 
sublime indifference to surroundings.” I maintain that Stoic 
philosophy is not fairly represented by Milton, it having pro- 
duced some of the greatest men we have had on the face of 
