274 REV. H. J. CLARKE. 
the meaning of the Logos I limited myself to an exposition 
of the philosophical import of the word. Of course I could 
not, having imposed that limitation on myself, say much in refer- 
ence to the Logos Prophorikos ; in fact, I could do no more than 
just allude to it, and I could not deal with the application of the 
word that might have been made had I enlarged upon the Alexan- 
drian conception of a sort of person,—a quasi person,—named 
the Word of God as the instrument by which he had acted, and 
upon the fact that Philo had, in fact, identified the Logos 
under that conception with the Logos of the Stoics; that 
is to say, in so far as his philosophy was that of the Stoics. 
The word Logos, in its philosophical import, as it seems to me, 
is suggested by the derivation of the word. It comes from the 
Greek term meaning “to lay,” and that is used in the sense of to 
arrange with order and method. It implies, therefore, the rational 
arrangement of thought, and hence it comes to mean the account of 
a thing, or the rationale of it. In its first philosophical use it 
certainly did not imply the rationality of the Being to which the word 
is applied. The Logos of Heracleitus was not a rational being,— 
was not a person. That, I think, must be quite clear from 
various expressions which he has applied to it, which show that 
his conception of the Logos was thoroughly materialistic,—was 
not that it is itself possessed of reason, though it was the origi- 
nator of psychic properties. It seems to me, therefore, that the 
word, in so far as it is to be treated as a term in philosophy, 
may be rendered “ the account of the universe.” The object of 
all philosophers seems to be to account for phenomena which 
constitute the universe, and for all other things which they 
might conceive as existing, though not objective to the senses. 
In respect to the remarks of the last speaker, I may say I did 
not intend to depreciate Plato’s conception of goodness in my 
assertion that it was by no means a perfect conception. Of 
course it is not to be supposed that his conception could be perfect. 
It was determined in a considerable measure by the immorality 
which prevailed in his age and nation. It was a very noble con- 
ception indeed,—a wonderful conception,—if we bear in mind the 
time at which, and the circumstances under which, he lived. I was 
disposed to do full justice to him ; I regard him as having been not 
only a large-minded man, but a true philosopher; but I could not 
help bearing in mind, at the time I was speaking of him, how far 
