MEANING AND HISTORY OF THE LOGOS OF PHILOSOPHY. 275 
his conception of goodness necessarily falls below that which we 
have acquired through the higher teaching that has come to us 
from above. I hope I did no injustice to the Stoics in the remarks 
I made in reference to their apathy. I called it an “affected 
apathy.” I did not mean by that that the apathy was pure affecta- 
tion. I rather intended to imply that their flattering ideal is, after 
all, above the reach of every human being,—that no one can be 
absolutely indifferent to his surroundings, whatever he may profess 
to be. At this late hour, I think, I shall not be expected to enter 
into all the particulars to which my attention has been called, in 
respect of which explanations were asked,—indeed, it would be 
impossible for me to go over the ground in detail. If I have 
omitted anything to which my attention was called by either of the 
two speakers, I should be glad if they would mention it now; but 
I cannot think that I do, in any material respect, differ from either 
of them in regard to the statements I have made in my paper. My 
object was to show that we are indebted to the Christian Faith for 
the noblest conceivable conception, and for the noblest conceivable 
representation of the character of the First Cause ; that we have a 
conception now, as we understand it, which is truly philosophical ; 
and we may challenge, I think, any persons who have adopted any 
system of philosophy which does not fall in with the Christian 
system, to produce, in their exposition, a Logos which may be com- 
pared with ours (cheers). 
The meeting then adjourned. 
FURTHER REPLY BY THE AUTHOR. 
In reference to matters touched upon in the course of the dis- 
cussion which followed the reading of my paper, a few supple- 
mentary words from me will, I hope, suffice to justify the state- 
ments I have made and the opinions I have expressed. 
My allusion to Spinoza was suggested partly by the tenor of his 
philosophy, and partly by reminiscences of explicit assertions which 
I had met with in his works.* 
* As samples I may instance the following :—‘‘ Deus proprie loquendo 
neminem amat” (Hth., part v., prop. 17, coroll.). “Qui Deum amat, 
conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet” (Jd., prop. 19). “Si 
roges : An Deus hunc non odio habeat, illum vero diligat ?.. . . respondeo 
Quod non” (Epist. xxxvi.), 
