the true nature of Instinct. 19 



being conscious that it is so, and which thus is really not so as 

 to them. The seat of these moral energies within them, therefore 

 appears to be a secret region in their minds, above the seat of their 

 natural perceptions ; the latter serving as a plane, as it were, for 

 the operation of such superior powers, which, under the Divine 

 control, dispose them to the fulfilment of the ends they are de- 

 signed for. 



In this manner it is possible to account for those surprising ap- 

 pearances of moral excellence in the actions of animals, which we 

 observe them to display, and which are so totally above their proper 

 conscious powers : — a moral excellence, which, as we have seen, 

 appears in many instances more perfect and undeviating than that 

 of the generality of human agents, and which therefore cannot be 

 the result of any conscious freedom in the creature, unless we 

 suppose them, in particular instances, raised higher In moral per- 

 ception and determination than even man himself. It is by con- 

 founding the limited freedom of brute action with the superior 

 energies, which, unknown to them, actuate their conscious 

 powers, that their nature has been so far mistaken, as to be con- 

 sidered the same in kind with, and only differing in degree from, 

 that of man. 



Herein then consists one proper limitation of the brute mind : — 

 although apparently) moral it is in reality not so, but merely na^ 

 tural^ and is operated upon by moral causes above its own consci- 

 ousness, and which lead it to the performance of actions which, 

 in effect, are moral, as considered objectively by the human mind. 

 From a comparison of this view of the nature of the consciousness 

 of animals with that of man, the latter agent alone appears capable 

 of considering and appreciating the nature of his own actions, and 

 those of the inferior creation ; he alone is conscious of moral, iii- 

 telleetua), and scientific energies and perceptions ; and being, in 

 consequence of this moral and intellectual faculty, at liberty to 

 estimate and direct all lower operations, is in moral and intelteC" 

 iual, as well as in natural freedom ; whereas the brute is in the 

 latter only. From the most dispassionate survey of brute nature, 

 it does not appear that the creatures have any reflex perception 

 respecting the qualities of their own discernment, or of the moral 



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