154 An Inquiri/ respecting the 



pearances alone, in favour of this opinion, prove too much ; and 

 consequently leave much to unsay : and that if examined under 

 their essential relations to that economy, they merely evince the 

 existence of a conscious nature in the lower animals, related to the 

 intelligent consciousness of Man, by analogy ; — but not by affinity.^ 



* It has been suggested to me that the rule in Natural History, \\ hich Mr. 

 W. S. Macleay has developed with so much ability and success, " that Rela- 

 tions of Analogy must be carefully distinguished from Relations of A^ffinity^'' may 

 be equally applicable to the subject before us. I can at present only offer a 

 few remarks in support of this idea, of which however I have to a certain exr 

 tent availed myself in the present Essay; and which appears to afford a 

 corollary to the theory of instinct now proposed : but I hope on a future oc- 

 casion, to render its validity apparent. Mr. Macleay, wlien explaining the 

 theoretical difference between affinity and analogy, concludes with the follow- 

 ing observation : "Asa relation of analogy must always depend on some mark- 

 ed property or peculiarity of structure, and as that of affinity, which connects 

 two [or more] ^^roups, becomes weaker and less visible as these groups are 

 more general, it is not in the least surprising, that what is only an analogical 

 correspondence in one or two important particulars, should often have been 

 mistaken for a general affinity." Now those philosophers, who, whilst com- 

 paring the attributes of the lower animals collectively, with those of Man, 

 have readily admitted the absolutely inferiority of the former, have yet, whilst 

 considering the mental relation to Man of particular species or groups, mis- 

 taken the ' analogical correspondence,' which the various forms of Instinct 

 bear to the rationality of Man, for a ' general affinity' between Man and the 

 Brute Creation : — for the result of their principles would be to shew that there 

 exists a gradual transition, ' a simple chain of affinities,' from rationality to 

 blind instinct. M. Frederic Cuvier, whilst considering the Brute Creation in 

 the aggregate, perceives that the minds of brutes can have no relation of 

 affinity to the human mind ; he therefore denies to them the power of reflec- 

 tion: but observing two species of action in brutes, the one apparently free, 

 the other apparently mechanical, he mistakes the relation of analogy which 

 these bear to the actions of Intelligence and Habit in Man, for one of affinity, 

 and virtually ascribes a relation of that kind to what he terms mechanical 

 instinct, and habit; and also to human, and what he denominates brute in- 

 telligence. Thus after denying reflection to brutes, he concedes to them the 

 very principle from which reflection flows. It seems equally true of the world 

 of mind as of that of organized matter, that though affinities are continuous, 

 yet, as Mr. Macleay observes, while discussing the notion of Bonnet as to the 

 law of continuity, ' the series of natural beings is not simple.' See Horae 

 Entomologicae, p. 362 — 364. Linn. Trans, vol. xiv. p. 48 — 62, &c. Diet, des 

 Sciences Naturelles, torn, xxiii. p. 528, et seq. Mem. du Mus. d' Hist. Nat. 

 torn. X. p. 241, et seq. 



