Dr, Flemins;^s views considered. 161 



'& 



more food than is necessary for the supply of present wants, 

 conceals (he remainder until again urged by the calls of hunger;" 

 these animals are said to possess a knowledge of time grounded in 

 ideas of reflection.* The last mentioned cases, prove merely the 

 existence of instinctive propensity and perception ; and are as 

 little adapted to support the doctrine of the animals' possessing 

 abstract ideas, such as those of time and space, as the history of 

 the Ml/gale ccementuria. All are illustrations of Instinct, not of 

 Intelligence. 



I might quote other examples to shew that the author in some 

 places practically attributes the means of accomplishing the ends 

 of Instinct, to an Intelligence the same in kind with that of human 

 reason; while in others he includes those means under the idea 

 of an Instinctive power, which, properly considered, totally ex- 

 cludes the operation of such Intelligence. Indeed the error of 

 the system appears to consist ; first. In the mental faculties of 

 the Brute being identified with those of Man, on account of the 

 analogical appearances in their actions ; and in making the facul- 

 ties thus defined the effective means for the accomplishment of 

 instinctive desires, which is in reality done by the author in his 

 consideration of the * Intellectual Powers :'+ and secondly. In 

 making the instinctive desires to include the operation of the same 

 faculties as are treated of under the head of ' Intellectual Powers.':^ 

 By the latter view we are called upon to deny the distinct 

 exercise of such * Intellectual Powers,' which would be fatal to 

 the theory ; and by the former we are necessitated to ascribe 

 them even to In sects. || 



* See Phil, of Zoo!, vol. i. p. 230. f lb. 215. :j: lb. 241. 



II Apparently aware of the difficulty with which the subject was beset. Dr. 

 Fleming remarks, (p. 312) " The impressions made upon the senses by external 

 objects, excite the movement of the intellectual powers, and they operate 

 equally on our instincts. The instinctive powers may be said to comprehend 

 the relation of our impressions almost intuitively. The will can excite the 

 senses to action, and the instincts can do the same. It is impossible, therefore, 

 in treating of the origin of the motions of animals, to separate the volition of 

 intellect from instinct, because few actions can be excited or continued by the 

 latter, without being perceived by the former. It was in const'quence of this 

 intimate connection, that we treated of the instinct of animals, along with the 



