162 An Inquity respecting the true Nature of Instinct. 



In order to clear the way for a due appreciation of the views I 

 purpose to develope in the sequel, 1 must now proceed to examine 

 the different, and very ingenious hypothesis of M. Frederic 

 Cuvier, as laid down by him in the article ' Instinct,' in the 

 ' Dictionnaire des Sciences Naturelles ;' and in connection there- 

 with, his examination of Mr. Dugald Stewart's opinions on the 

 nature of habit, which has appeared in a late number of the 

 ' Memoires du Museum.' 



This skilful naturalist endeavours io fix a distinction between 

 Intelligence and Instinct, by means of the character of variability 

 applied to the former, and that of invariability applied to the 

 latter ; without entering into any examination of the essential 

 nature of Instinct, of which he observes in a note, p. 529 of the 

 Diet, des Sciences Nat. " nous ne sommes point encore censes con- 

 functions of mind [or Intellectual Powers] which depend on the nervous sys- 

 tem. Wt by no means, however, give it as our opinion, that Instinct and IntellU 

 gence are the same, either in kind or in degree.'" How this latter observation can 

 be made to tally with a preceding one (p. 242), I am at a loss to conceive. 

 " Much confusion," says the author, " has arisen by the vague use of the 

 terms Instinct and Reason, and much vain speculation has been indulged, in 

 consequence of no distinct and definite ideas being attached to them. No con- 

 fusion, however, could arise, were we to consider reason as expressing the 

 movements of our Intellectual powers, — and instinct those which have hitherto 

 been termed Active." Nor is it easy to see how this theoretical distinction is 

 preserved when cases of pure instinct are adduced as proofs of intelligence 

 under the head of Intellectual Powers, in the manner pursued by the author, 

 in which such principles are attributed to the creature under the same sense 

 and meaning as he attributes them to Man, (See definition of Imagination, 

 p. 221 — 225, &c.) It surely does not meet the difficulty, nor is it consistent, 

 in distinguishing between Intellect and Instinct, to make the former a passive 

 spectator, by saying that " few actions can be excited or continued by the 

 latter without being perceived by the former," when at the same time, the 

 Intellect is made, by the author's method of considering the subject, not 

 merely to perceive, but to be the active instrument in accomplishing the appe- 

 tites, desires and aflfections, of Instinct. A conscious intelligence, such as that 

 illustrated by the author, including ideas of reflection, synthesis, and analysis, 

 is either the means by which Instinctive Desires act, or it is not. 



Should the above remarks meet Dr. Fleming's eye, he will I am sure receive 

 them with that candour which distinguishes the lover of truth; and as I have 

 no other view in offering them than that the truth may prevail, he will not im~ 

 putc to me any wish of depreciating his useful labours in Zoological science. 



