17^ An Inquiry respecting the true Nature of Instinct. 



essential cause of those actions, whose production is not marked 

 by any sensible reasoning operation. 



Proueness indeed properly belongs to the Affections, or Will ; 

 and must, in the present case, be considered distinctly from the 

 Faculty of Intelligence : in the same manner as Ave have seen that 

 Desires are to be considered distinctly from Perceptions, in the 

 case of Instinct. The Will may, in certain cases, be so strong as 

 to overpower the whole mental region ; but in these cases it is 

 rather to be considered as the occasion than as the cause of action 

 or inaction. Will supplies the motive, — Intelligence the means : 

 in this respect they are or ought to be co-ordinate ; if the balance 

 be destroyed the Principle of Intelligence is either perverted 

 or rendered inert.* The proposition of M. Cuvier illustrates 

 this, when he says, " Le sentiment de la peur suspend dans ce 

 cas le mouvement des muscles ou les excite, sans que I'intelli- 

 gence paroisse y prendre la moindre part."+ But it furnishes, I 

 conceive, no proof of the essential absence of Intelligence in any 

 acts which may be executed in such states of disorder : but merely 

 of the perversion or interruption of the proper agency of Intelli- 

 gence. M. Cuvier, indeed, affords an explanation of this phenome- 

 non, when he says, in a previous note,:}: " Les dispositions et les 

 besoins ne conduisent pas necessairement a des actions aveugles," 

 &c. The sentiment of fear is evidently one of those dispositions 

 which, if not controlled, are capable of bearing down every power 

 of the mind. 



That this circumstance of propensity or disposition, is very 

 generally instrumental in modifying habits, need scarcely be re- 

 marked ; and when taken into the consideration of the subject, 

 it may assist in their subdivision into particular classes. 



Habits may be considered generally under two distinct classes : 

 voluntary and involuntary. The former we have already dwelt 

 upon. The latter may be illustrated by the instance of the 



* I have all alonsj supposed such a co-ordination of affection, or will, when 

 treating of Intelligence; since the will supplies motive or desire, without 

 which it is impossible for the intellect to act. 



+ Diet, des Sciences Nat. torn, xxiii. p. 540. 



t Ibid. p. 528. 



