214 CANON W. SAUMAREZ SMITH, B.D. 
tion.”” Nor does it seem improbable that the excitement pro- 
duced in some minds by premature hopes of rapid political 
and social progress in an age of extraordinary scientific dis- 
covery, and of application of science to the material wants of 
men, tends to beget an impatient attitude of mind, which, 
when not counterbalanced by moral and religious motives, 1s 
apt to foster a despairing view of the world, and of the 
capabilities for happiness of human life. 
Reasoned pessimism, however, cannot stand critical 
analysis, for it is inconsistent with the facts of human 
history, and with the faculties of the human mind. It is 
entirely madequate to explain the positive and persistent 
aspirations of human nature. As a philosophy it becomes 
unmeaning, unless egoistic Hedonism be regarded as_ the 
only possible explanation of life, and pain and sufferimg be 
treated as final and absolutely independent facts. Intel- 
lectually viewed, pessimism is mental suicide, and to assert 
that ‘all is illusion”? is a mystical despair, not a rational 
affirmation. 
Optimism has far more a priori reason in its favour than 
the opposite theory ; but it is confronted by the mysterious 
existence of many phenomena which seem to hinder the 
pleasure, the progress, and the happiness of mankind, and to 
interfere with that tendency to harmony and joy which the 
optimistic theory asserts. or the operation of what we call 
“evil” compels us to regard evil not merely as privation and 
defeat, but as a strange, antagonistic force which mars joy, 
hampers progress, and seems inconsistent with the ascription 
of perfect goodness either to God or to Nature. 
5. The truth is that both lines of speculation can be sup- 
ported by an array of facts and experiences. But the practical 
resultant which emerges from a fair and full comparison of 
the arguments that can be advanced on either side is dis- 
tinctly anti-pessimistic. It should not be forgotten that the 
question can only be fairly dealt with by recognising that we 
have to do with metaphysical and ethical phenomena, and 
that—however much the discoveries of physical science may 
modify philosophical theories—it is still to the mental, and 
not to the materialistic, side of our knowledge that disputants 
on all fundamental problems that touch human action and 
desire must make their final appeal. This being allowed, it 
will be perceived that truth-seekers in this dispute aim not 
at a demonstrative proof, but at moral certainty, and that 
what we have to look for is not a complete (“ scientific’) 
explanation, but a reasonable inference concerning the prin- 
ciples which should guide us in our view of the constitution 
