ON PRACTICAL OPTIMISM. 217 
Theistic speculation, on the other hand, must be opti- 
mistic, whether we argue from our knowledge or from our 
ignorance in reference to the Supreme Beng. What we 
know, even apart from the teaching of the Hebrew and 
Christian Scriptures, encourages the conviction that the 
Supreme Will is beneficent, and not maleficent. What we 
know, when we receive the revelations in those Scriptures, 
» makes that conviction ineradicable. And then our ignorance 
_ of the whole scheme and constitution of nature serves to check 
complaint as well as doubt. We cannot fall into a boastful 
optimism and ignore evil, but we feel that, as within our 
knowledge, so beyond it, the constitution and order of things 
must perpetually tend to that which is good. 
8. This conviction (so far as the philosophical expression 
and exposition of it is concerned) is best seen in the optimism 
of lLeibnitz. His Theodicée is an able and thoughtful 
endeavour to vindicate God’s government of the world from 
a rational point of view. Whatever weakness or defect may 
be found in the reasoning, considered as a complete argument, 
it is of permanent value, and exhibits an irrepressible impulse 
of Godward consciousness in a cultured mind.  Leibnitz 
argued that God, as the first reason of things, must be perfect 
in wisdom, power, and goodness. He could not fail, there- 
fore, to choose what is best. To the Divine Intelligence all 
possibilities represent themselves, and from “an infinity of 
possible worlds,”’ the one selected must have been the “ best 
possible.” It was very easy for Voltaire, in his clever but 
superficial satirical tale of Candide, to ridicule this notion, 
but almost all the sting of the satire is taken away when we 
remember that Leibnitz did not argue that this world is the 
best of all possible worlds absolutely, but as viewed relatively 
to what we must conceive as the process of Divine govern- 
ment of the universe. ‘'T'o arrive at a true estimate, we must 
not only consider isolated details and events, we must regard 
“toute la suite des choses.” ‘Il se pourrait que Vunivers 
allat toujours de mieux en mieux si telle était la nature des 
choses qw’il ne fit point permis d’atteindre au meilleur d’un 
seul coup.” ‘This principle of “‘ perfectibility,” according to 
a Divine order, is intellectually reasonable, and practically 
encouraging. 
9. It is true that this optimistic theory may become a 
superficial and abstract dogmatism, and by its one-sidedness 
provoke a grim counter-statement of the miseries and dis- 
appointments which characterise much of human life as known 
to and observed by us, and seem primd facie to refute the 
more sanguine philosophy. The ‘easy-going optimism” of 
