ON PRACTICAL OPTIMISM. 219 
learn or to teach. Its origin may be, in the ultimate form 
in which the problem presents itself, inexplicable; but the 
question, ‘“‘ What is evil?” presses for some sort of answer. 
11. Leibnitz, as is well known, classified evil as meta- 
physical, physical, and moral. In the first aspect evil is 
simply the «imperfection which we necessarily connect with all 
finite existence ; in the second aspect evil is pain, as opposed 
to pleasure; in the third aspect evil is sin, as opposed to 
righteous action. ‘This classification is a convenient and an 
instructive one, and saves us from much confusion of 
thought. Without some such distinction we are in danger 
of calling evil good, and good evil, for our first inclination is 
to call everything that is painful bad, and to call everything 
that is pleasurable good ; but to recognise that pleasure may 
be hurtful, and that pain may be beneficial, is a conviction 
which depends very much upon our making a correct analysis 
of what constitutes evil. 
12. Thus we are met by the important consideration, how 
are we to judge concerning good and evil? The individual 
experience cannot be a sufficient test; it needs a wide com- 
parison of the phenomena of human life and history to enable 
us to draw a general inference which may be of practical 
worth. It will be at once perceived that such a comparison 
involves many social, political, and theological problems, and 
that, as our inquiry is necessarily in its ultimate form an 
ethical one, the claims of the Christian religion to be the 
universal religion for mankind has much to do with the 
question of the worth of life. All philosophy of hfe must be 
affected by our views of God, and of what we receive as 
revelations of His will and purposes. We leave aside from 
this discussion, as far as possible, dogmatic theology ; yet we 
venture to assert that those who will not allow the ideas of 
Divine Will, Righteousness, and Goodness, as historically 
presented in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, to enter 
into their reasoning concerning the value of hfe and the 
destiny of men, are guilty of a most unphilosophical omission. 
13. When we have recognised the need of making dis- 
tinctions between various forms of so-called “ evil,’ and have 
honestly consulted the historical materials at our disposal, we 
find three notable phenomena which interfere with the opti- 
mistic view of life and human destiny—viz. pain, sorrow, and 
sin. Of these, the first interferes with sensuous enjoyment, 
the second interferes with, mental tranquillity, and the third 
interferes with moral satisfaction. 
14. But it can, without difficulty, be shown that pain and 
sorrow are, as a matter of fact, in many cases subservient to 
VOL. XXI. R 
