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duty, when it does not lead to any violation of tlie principles 

 of rectitude ; only it ought not to be confined to the present 

 life, but should provide also for happiness in a life to come. 

 When it is confined to the present life, it is called worldliness, 

 which has thence become a term of reproach, as implying the 

 neglect of a man's highest interests, while unduly caring for 

 his worldly welfare. But when used by an unbeliever in a 

 world to come, there can be no reproach implied in it, be- 

 cause then it simply means a prudent regard to prosperity 

 and comfort in the only world whose existence he acknow- 

 ledges. If this be a correct description of worldliness, as I 

 venture to think it is, there is really no intelligible meaning 

 in the term " other-worldliness," as implying that a regard to 

 happiness in a future state is a wrong motive. The very per- 

 sons who use it would be among the last to find fault with a 

 due regard to worldly welfare, and are therefore inconsistent 

 when they insinuate that there is anything faulty in the en- 

 deavour to secui'e lasting happiness in another world. A 

 desire for happiness, in short, is one of the strongest princi- 

 ples implanted in our nature, and nothing can be more absurd 

 than to expect that a religion which has any pretension to 

 exert an influence in the world, should ignore it, or fail to 

 contain a provision for working upon it ; subordinate, of 

 course, to the higher motive of acting according to right. 

 This higher motive is that which the enemies of Christianity 

 endeavour to keep out of view. 



That selfishness is not to be confounded with a reasonable 

 self-love is obvious. A selfish person is one who thinks only 

 of himself, and has no regard to the feelings, wishes, or com- 

 forts of others. But a reasonable self-love is quite compatible 

 with a regard to the happiness of others. There may, no 

 doubt, be particular cases in which we are compelled to choose 

 between the good of ourselves and that of our neighbours, 

 but these are comparatively rare : and it is evident that the 

 two 'principles of a desire for our own and for our neighbour's 

 advantage are quite compatible, and in general conducive the 

 one to the other, when all the circumstances are taken into 

 account. 



I have said that besides the duty of regulating our actions 

 by the rule of rectitude, Christianity supplies us with motives 

 which, if duly encouraged and cultivated, are of great assist- 

 ance towards enabling us to act up to what is right. The 

 chief and highest of these additional motives is love to God, 

 with the desire to please Him which such love is calculated to 

 engender. This, as well as that principle of rectitude which 

 lies at the root of all morality, is entirely left out by Mr. 



