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man does^ and in the other of the man himself. Again, if 

 difficulty were essential to a virtuous act, the vicious character 

 of an act would also depend on whether it is easy or difficult. 

 And I do not think any one would maintain that the guilt 

 attached to the perpetration of a murder would not be guilt if 

 the question whether it was easy or difficult were decided 

 either way. If it be done under difficulties, it only shows the 

 determination of the murderer to be the stronger, and if it be 

 done with ease, it is equally a wicked deed. It seems to me, 

 therefore, that we have now disposed of the question whether 

 difficulty is essential to the moral character of an action, and 

 have fairly decided it in the negative. 



There remains still the question whether utility makes an 

 action to be virtuous. Here, again, we must take in the 

 consideration of motive, as the most useful action that ever 

 was done must be morally bad if the motive that induced it be 

 bad. The question, then, should be put in this form. Does 

 the intention of doing good, or — if its results be of a mixed 

 character — of doing more good than harm, make an action to 

 be morally good ? 



As this question has long exercised the deliberations of 

 moralists, of whom there are two schools, chiefly represented 

 by Bishop Butler on the one hand and Archdeacon Paley 

 on the other, it seems to me that it would be a superfluous 

 task to discuss it here. My only reason for not entirely 

 leaving the matter in the hands of those two eminent writers 

 is, that Butler, in opposing the doctrine that utility is the 

 foundation of morality, assumed a Creator, and thence inferred 

 the reality of moral distinctions, on the principle that God has 

 so constituted us as to have a perception of those distinctions, 

 which we cannot suppose He would have done if they did not 

 exist. As this argument could not have weight with those 

 who deny a Creator, and as our present business is with these, 

 a few words seem necessary to make our subject complete. 



It cannot, I think, be denied that there are certain things 

 which all human beings have a right to. Every one, for 

 example, has a right to his life, as is acknowledged in the 

 laws of civilised countries, which make homicide in self- 

 defence to be justifiable. Every one also has a right to his 

 limbs, as is acknowledged in the laws against mutilation ; and 

 every one has a right to his personal liberty. These rights 

 may be called natural, as without the recognition of them all 

 social relations must be destroyed, and man is by nature 

 sociable. It is true that rights may, under certain circum- 

 stances, be forfeited, as when a murderer justly suffers the 

 punishment of death, with the loss of his liberty for the time 



